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Despite law enforcement’s best efforts, terrorist groups are expanding at alarming 
rates. One of the easiest ways to prevent terrorist attacks is to prevent individuals from 
joining terrorist organizations. Counter-terrorism programs that effectively reduce 
membership, reduce association and increase desistance to terror groups will undoubtedly 
reduce terror incidents. This research identifies risk factors that greatly influence an 
individual’s decision to join a terrorist group; policy makers can use this information to 
design new policies aimed at prevention and intervention.  
If the U.S. government is looking for community-oriented solutions to criminal 
groups, it need look no further than the study of domestic street gangs. There is vast 
research into theories, strategies and programs that policy makers can reference. Because 
these models already exist for street gangs, the government need not waste time 
developing new strategies from scratch. This research discovered the group dynamic and 
processes that exist for street gangs exits similarly for terrorist organizations. It is the 
hope that this research lends new direction to the developing policies and de-
radicalization strategies that are currently underway. 
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One way to avoid terrorist attacks is to prevent individuals from joining terrorist 
organizations in the first place. Yet, despite law enforcement’s best efforts, people 
continue to join terrorist organizations at alarming rates. A new deterrence strategy is 
sorely needed. 
In 2015, the U.S. government convened for a three-day summit at the White 
House to develop new strategies to counter violent extremism (CVE). Their goal was to 
coordinate local, state and federal stakeholders in countering behaviors that “radicalize, 
recruit and incite violence.”1 But this was not the federal government’s first attempt at a 
national CVE strategy. In 2011, the federal government released a CVE national strategy 
called “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States.” 
It was a three-pronged approach that included “community engagement, better training 
and counter-narratives” to extremist ideologies.2 The authors recognized that 
communities at a local level were best suited to combat violent extremism because they 
were better positioned to identify program clients.3 Therefore, the battle against violent 
extremism was to take a community-oriented approach.  
If the U.S. government is looking for community-oriented solutions to deter 
criminal groups, they need look no further than the study of domestic street gangs. Gangs 
have been a focus of concern for many public officials, community service practitioners 
and researchers for decades. As such, the study has seen its share of theories that attempt 
to explain gang membership and offending and delinquent behavior. New CVE program 
developers may be able to use these same theories to help explain terrorists’ behaviors.  
                                                 
1 Office of the Press Secretary, “The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism,” The 
White House, February 18, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/fact-sheet-
white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism. 
2 Dina Temple-Raston, “White House Unveils Counter-Extremism Plan,” NPR, August 3, 2011, 
http://www.npr.org/2011/08/04/138955790/white-house-unveils-counter-extremism-plan. 
3 White House, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States 
(Washington, DC: White House, 2011). 
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Any prevention or intervention program’s success starts with targeting 
appropriate program clients—in this case, terrorists or people on the path to 
radicalization. Any program that engages likely non-joiners can be very costly and highly 
ineffective.4 This type of program, therefore, requires some form of early identification 
and specific targeting of the risk factors that make one more likely to join a group. This 
research has honed in on four common characteristics that make individuals more likely 
to join both terrorist and street-gang organizations: identity deprivation, poverty, 
progression and peer pressure. It should be noted that most people who possess one or 
more of these risk factors still do not join street gangs or terrorist organizations.5 In fact, 
only a small percentage of people actually join these types of groups.6 Regardless, before 
a program can be developed, the at-risk population must be identified; while possessing 
one of these risk factors may be a good start, possessing multiple factors is much more 
predicative.7 
Identity Deprivation 
To resolve personal crises, people will often search for identity through a process 
called self-categorization, in which they seek out groups that have ideologies or 
characteristics with which they identify.8 A person seeking a new or different identity 
may then adopt an identity put forth by a group. Once a member of the group, the 
individual then assumes the ideology and behavior patterns the other group members. 
Once people become members of groups, however, they begin to compare themselves to 
the other members and hope they are faring better.9 If not, they may look to leave their 
group.  
                                                 
4 Malcom W. Klein and Cheryl L. Maxson, Street Gang: Patterns and Policies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
5 Ibid., 105 
6 Ibid. 
7 “Frequently Asked Questions about Gangs,” National Gang Center, accessed January 25, 2015, 
http://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/about/FAQ#q2. 
8 Kevin Durrheim, “Introduction to Social Identity Posted by Henri Tajfel,” YouTube video, 11:35, 
posted by Henri Tajfel, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tf5_gWa3h2g (accessed July 18, 2015). 
9 Ibid. 
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This group dynamic presents CVE program developers with an opportunity to 
prevent individuals from joining targeted groups, and possibly the opportunity to 
persuade them to leave; CVE program developers should focus on strategies that confer 
diminished self-esteem to terrorist groups.  
Poverty 
Poverty does not necessarily refer to economic status. It can refer to respect, love, 
education, or any number of perceived wealths. Professor Fathali Moghaddam writes, 
“Relative deprivation…is how individuals feel about their situation relative to particular 
others, how deprived they feel subjectively and in a comparative sense, rather than how 
they are doing according to objective criteria.”10 People may join terrorist organizations 
or street gangs if doing so helps secure resources, obtain desires, or accomplish goals 
It is not possible to satisfy everyone’s needs. However, CVE program developers 
need to fashion socially acceptable ways for people to reasonably obtain those things 
street gangs and terrorist organizations provide for their members.  
Progression 
Terrorists are not born; they are made.11 This progression can happed rapidly or 
occur over the course of several years. Failed neo-liberal policies, poor governance, 
political instability and economic recessions have caused Middle Eastern youths to 
become stuck in a period of limbo for protracted periods of time.12 Some have joined  
terrorist organizations and/or street gangs because the group provided the only 
opportunity for the individual to exit this stalled state and progress.13  
                                                 
10 Fathali Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” American 
Psychologist 60, no. 2 (2005): 162–163. 
11 Anne C. Speckhard. Talking to Terrorists (McLean, VA: Advances Press, 2012), 15909. 
12 Alcinda Honwana, “‘Waithood’: Youth Transitions and Social Change,” in Development and 
Equity, eds. Dick Foeken, Leo de Haan, and Linda Johnson, 28–40 (Social Sciences E-Books Online, 
2014), doi 10.1163/9789004269729_004. 
13 Mohamed Ali, “The Link between Unemployment and Terrorism,” speech, September 2013, 
http://www.ted.com/talks/mohamed_ali_the_link_between_unemployment_and_terrorism/transcript?langu
age=en#t-19391 (accessed July 1, 2015). 
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Moghaddam used the metaphor of a staircase to describe this progression. He 
explains that the majority of people begin on the ground floor, where they feel frustrated 
and deprived of material resources.14 In an effort to better their situation, they ascend to 
the next floor. Each successive floor comes with more exposure to radicalized ideology 
and behavior. Eventually, a small few wind up on the top floor, which leads to an act of 
terror.15  
CVE program developers need to create strategies that engage this youthful 
population. Job training, placement and entrepreneurship education may help stymie this 
state of limbo. Coordination and input from the private businesses in communities is 
integral to a successful strategy.  
Peer Pressure 
Peer influence is the most consistent predicator of group membership.16 An 
individual’s behavior is overwhelmingly influenced by personal connections.17 If one 
family member is part of a group, for example, there is a greater probability that other 
family members will join.18 A study by the National Gang Crime Research Center found 
most gang members already had family members in the gang prior to joining.19 Peer 
pressure exerted by an individual or group encourages others to change their attitudes, 
values or behavior to conform to the groups’.20Once a terrorist and/or street gang 
member is identified, program managers should look to their peer networks for other 
potential program clients.  
                                                 
14 Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism,” 163. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Klein and Maxson. Street Gang.  
17 Donelson R. Forsyth, Group Dynamics, 5th Edition (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Cengage Learning, 
2010), 137. 
18 Keren Brooking, Ben Gardiner, and Sarah Calvert, Backround of Students in Alternative Education: 
Interviews with a Selected 2008 Cohort (Research, New Zealand: Ministry of Education, 2009). 
19 Amanda Vogt, “Gangs: A Cry For Family?” Chicago Tribune. December 24, 1996. 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-12-24/features/9612240065_1_gang-members-kids-probation-
officer (accessed July 15, 2015). 




The material covered in this research illustrates the similarities between street 
gang members and terrorists. If nothing else, it reminds us that these people still belong 
to groups. Prevention and intervention programs will fare better if they are fashioned 
from what we know about group processes.  
There is a long academic history in the study of gangs. That accumulated 
knowledge coupled with the experiences in successful and failed intervention programs 
should be a solid starting point for upcoming CVE strategies. There is no need to develop 
brand new models and spend years of research before developing a program. Past gang 
research should suffice. Gang theories, models and programs may not explicitly tell us 
what to do but, rather may guide us away from what not to do.  
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Despite law enforcement’s best efforts, people continue to join terrorist 
organizations at alarming rates. One way to avoid terrorist attacks is to prevent 
individuals from joining terrorist organizations in the first place. A solution may lie in the 
study of street gangs, which recruit and retain members similarly to terrorist groups. This 
study asks: Are the individual characteristics and social conditions influencing 
individuals to join domestic street gangs the same as those for foreign terrorist 
organizations? 
Since September 11, 2001, people have debated if foreign terrorist organizations 
are similar to domestic street gangs. The controversy stems from researchers’ 
reluctance—namely criminologists who study street gangs, and terrorist analysts who 
study terrorist organizations—to accept these similarities, opting, instead, to exaggerate 
the differences. 
Criminologists believe terrorists’ political and/or religious motivations distinguish 
them from gang members—even though some terrorists may fit neatly into the social 
theories and models developed for gangs. Meanwhile, some terrorist analysts believe 
street gangs are only motivated by personal gain (e.g., money); politics or religion play 
no role in the making of a street gangster, in this view. Some terrorists, however, have 
been known to commit crimes merely to support their political and/or religious agendas. 
Likewise, street gangs exist for a variety of motivations. Yet these differences do not 
preclude them from being identified as a street gang. 
The Department of Homeland Security, along with federal, state and local 
governments, is currently in the midst of developing counter-terrorism programs and 
intervention policies. The goal of this research is to identify specific factors that cause 
individuals to join violent groups; homeland security programs can then use this 
information to model programs that deter terrorist organization membership. Whichever 
characteristics street gangs and terrorist groups may or may not share, both groups recruit 
and accept members to carry out illegal acts that often involve violence. This observation 
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is the starting point for this research, which explores individual characteristics and social 
conditions that encourage individuals to join domestic street gangs, and seeks to 
determine if they are the same for terrorist organizations. 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Martin Sanchez-Jankowski, in his article “Gangs and the Structure of U.S. 
Society,” acknowledged there is a tremendous amount of research conducted into the 
growth of street gangs.21 Yet, despite this abundant research, the study of gangs can be 
broken down into only two categories: the first describes gangs based upon their behavior 
and the crimes they commit, and second analyzes the individual characteristics that may 
influence a person to join a gang.22 This research focuses on the latter category and, 
specifically, the individual and societal characteristics of identity, poverty, progression 
and peer influence.23  
There is no shortage in the study of domestic street gangs, especially by 
criminologists. Criminology is defined as the “scientific study of the nature, control, 
punishment and prevention of criminal behavior by individuals.”24 It includes many 
different disciplines, such as sociology, behavioral psychology and law. In addition, 
criminology explores the many physical and psychological characteristics of criminals in 
an effort to design control strategies for law enforcement.25 Yet, one group of criminals 
is having a hard time getting criminologists’ attention: terrorists.  
Since the tragic events of 9/11, there has been a surprising lack of criminology 
research into terrorism. After a review of the literature, most criminologists suggest that, 
although terrorists commit crimes, they do not fit neatly into the “criminal” category; 
researchers allude to differences in ideology, motivation and violence as the main 
                                                 




24 Anthony Walsh and Lee Ellis, Criminology: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
SAGE Publications.2007), 1–3. 
25 Ric Curtis, “What is Criminology?” John Jay College of Criminal Justice Online, accessed January 
3, 2015, http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/departments/sociology/about_criminology.php. 
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dissimilarities. Smith, Rush and Burton state the difference quite simply: street gangs 
commit crime for money while terrorist organizations seek to advance a political or 
religious agenda.26 This does not imply, however, that all gangs and all terrorist 
organizations are centered on those ideas. For the remainder of this research, any 
conclusions are only suggested to apply to some street gang members and some terrorists; 
nothing in this research is meant to imply “all street gang members” or “all terrorists.”  
Political agendas are not exclusive to terrorist groups; some gangs have involved 
themselves in politics. In October 1993, the Almighty Conservative Vice Lords, a local 
Chicago street gang, took to the streets not to commit crime, but to register new voters for 
an upcoming political election.27 They even went as far as conducting voter education 
classes, and marching in protests about healthcare and school system reform.28 None of 
these actions are criminal, and could be seen as political. Some literature suggests gangs 
only engage in politics to further their criminal enterprise. They accomplish this by 
infiltrating and corrupting existing governmental systems.29 Over the last ten years, some 
Chicago politicians have allegedly received illegal bribes from local street gangs in 
exchange for jobs, tip offs to law enforcement operations and other favors.30 Reasons 
aside, street gangs have engaged in politics.  
The moralistic nature of crime has also been used to show differences between 
gang members and terrorists. Prominent criminologist Donald Black believed labeling 
terrorism as a crime ignores its moralistic character and “is the surest way to obscure its 
                                                 
26 Carter Smith, Jeff Rush, and Catherine Burton, “Street Gangs, Organized Crime Groups, and 
Terrorist: Differentiating Criminal Organizations,” Investigative Sciences Journal Online, January 2013, 
www.investigativesciencesjournal.org/article/download/11431/7717 (accessed January 3, 2015), 4–7. 




29 Smith, Rush, and Burton. “Street Gangs, Organized Crime Groups, and Terrorist.” 
30 David Bernstein and Noah Isackson, “Gangs and Politicians in Chicago: An Unholy Alliance,” 
Chicago Magazine, December 13, 2011, http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/January-
2012/Gangs-and-Politicians-An-Unholy-Alliance/ (accessed January 23, 2015). 
 4 
sociological identity and obstruct its scientific understanding.”31 The perpetrators of 
crimes such as robbery, rape and burglary do not believe they have a moral obligation to 
commit such crimes. Some terrorists, on the other hand, do.32 Professor Richard 
Rosenfeld supports this claim:  
Terrorism is moralistic or justice-oriented violence accomplished by 
predatory means. The genesis of terrorist violence lies within a particular 
configuration of social institutions at odds with the institutional 
triumvirate of modern society: free markets, liberal democracy, and 
religious tolerance. Terrorism represents a grievance against modernity.33 
Some terrorists believe the use of violence is moral, and necessary in the fight 
against modernity. Yet Nathanson has stated actions can be morally wrong even if the 
intended goals are generally valuable.34 In this line of thought, the ends do not justify the 
means.  
The etiology of criminal behavior notwithstanding, street gangs and terrorist 
organizations both commit crime in varying degrees and spaces. There are no crimes one 
can commit that would not make one a criminal. Criminologists study criminals. 
Therefore, criminologists should study terrorism.  
A third, and perhaps biggest, contention that appears in the literature is violence. 
Throughout the literature review, it was clear that just about every author had to wrestle 
with descriptions of violence associated with terrorism. The magnitude of violence 
referenced in ordinary crime, such as robbery, rape and burglary, pales in comparison to 
recent acts of terrorism. 9/11 is just one example. Donald Black believed the level of 
violence employed during 9/11 was of such an enormous magnitude that it could not be 
characteristic of ordinary criminal violence.35 Therefore, he argues, it cannot be studied 
                                                 
31 For more information see: Donald Black, “Terrorism as Social Control,” in Terrorism and Counter-
Terrorism: Criminological Perspectives, ed. Mathieu Deflem, 9–18 (New York: Elsevier, 2004), 12. 
32 Samuel Scheffler. “Is Terrorism Morally Distinctive?” Journal of Political Philosophy 14, no. 1 
(April 2006): 1–17. 
33 Richard Rosenfeld, “Terrorism and Criminology,” in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: 
Criminological Perspectives, ed. Mathieu Deflem, 19–32 (New York: Elsevier, 2004). 
34 Stephen Nathanson, Terrorism and the Ethics of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010). 
35 Black, “Terrorism as Social Control,” 9. 
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by criminologists. Instead, Black believes terrorism is a form of quasi-warfare because it 
attacks civilians in addition to military targets. He uses the word “warfare” because the 
level of violence corresponds more to the mass killings akin to war than to crime.36 On 
the other hand, Richard Rosenfeld states, “Black calls it ‘quasi-warfare,’ but a more 
precise term is ‘criminal-warfare.’ Terrorism is the nexus of warlike aims and criminal 
(i.e., predatory) means.”37 This makes terrorism not only a military problem, as Black 
would suggest, but a criminal justice problem as well.  
The U.S. criminal justice system is already engaged in the fight against 
terrorism.38 The United States Department of Justice boasts that they have already done a 
successful job incapacitating terrorists and gathering intelligence.39 So, the differing level 
of violence has not stopped the criminal justice system from actively engaging in 
counter-terrorism efforts and arresting terrorist for criminal offenses.  
While criminologists and terrorist analysts seem unable to operate on the same 
playing field, terrorist organizations and street gangs have been cooperating with each 
other throughout the years. Craig Collins contends, “There has always been a concern 
amongst law enforcement that someone or organization with an electrifying charisma 
would show up and unite all these gangs into one big criminal enterprise or devious 
cause.”40 Law enforcement agencies have long feared international terrorist organizations 
may develop alliances with U.S. street gangs.41 Their fear may stem from the 
documented history of domestic terrorist organizations working with some urban street 
gangs to commit acts of terror.  
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For example, in the early 1970s, the Black Liberation Army (BLA), a militant 
extremist organization who vehemently hated law enforcement, solicited the Black 
Spades—New York City’s largest street gang at the time—to murder police officers.42 
According to the Fraternal Order of Police, the BLA was already responsible for the 
deaths of 13 police officers countrywide.43 Because of increased law enforcement 
scrutiny, the BLA reckoned it would be easier for a street gang with less law enforcement 
attention to accomplish their goals. So they recruited the Black Spades. The Black Spades 
agreed to the conspiracy and the BLA supplied the weapons to carry out the plot. Luckily 
law enforcement thwarted the scheme before anyone was murdered.  
Perhaps a better-known alliance—this time to commit an act of terror—was 
between Chicago’s feared El Rukn street gang and the government of Libya in the 1980s. 
The El Rukns, because of their hunger for money and power, were easily susceptible to 
recruitment efforts by the Libyan government.44 In 1986, the El Rukns agreed to bomb 
U.S. governmental buildings for the Libyan government in return for cash and sanctuary 
in Libya. Through a series of El Rukns’ missteps, however, the plot was quickly thwarted 
and several prominent gang members were arrested. 
Since 9/11, more and more attention has focused on the potential alliances 
between street gangs and terrorist organizations. It was a major topic at the Eleventh 
United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. In their report, 
published in April of 2005, the Congress outlined several characteristics of established 
criminal networks like street gangs that would make them attractive partners to terrorist 
organizations.45 Likewise, terrorist organizations seek networks such as gangs because 
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they have an ability to move money and share information, and are knowledgeable about 
government systems, including law enforcement operations.46 
Some criminologists, such as G. David Curry, have refuted such alliances, 
claiming the relationships are much too complex. Criminal organizations exist to make 
money, he says.47 They depend on going undetected from law enforcement. Terrorist 
organizations, especially after 9/11, bring with them a huge amount of law enforcement 
attention, which would not be beneficial to a gang.48 Yet, despite Curry’s contentions, 
some street gangs have already cooperated with terror organizations. 
Whether one chooses to believe terrorist organizations and street gangs are similar 
or dissimilar, based upon criminologists’ arguments associated with motivation, ideology 
or violence are irrelevant to this research. It is also irrelevant to discount or accept their 
associations throughout the years to commit acts of terror. What is important to this 
research is that both groups, as demonstrated by the readings, recruit, attract, solicit and 
accept the membership of individuals.49 The primary focus of this research is to identify 
the specific individual characteristics and social conditions that influence a person to join 
a street gang and/or terrorist organization. Comparing and juxtaposing these two groups 
helps determine if these individual characteristics and social conditions are endemic to 
one particular group or are if they universal. 
When studying deviant groups, there is a considerable amount of research 
dedicated to street gangs. The earliest research was conducted by Dr. Frederic Thrasher 
in his seminal work, The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago in 1927. Dr. Thrasher 
studied 1920s Chicago street gangs from a sociological perspective, in which he 
examined individual characteristics such as poverty and environmental factors.50 Dr. 
Thrashers’ work was considered so groundbreaking and foundational that much of his 
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work still influences researchers today.51 This influence has led future researchers to 
analyze and expand the individual characteristics. Though the attributes are by no means 
comprehensive, they are heavily researched and common amongst many authors. It is 
widely agreed that multiple risk factors working in combination, rather than any 
characteristic alone, better predicts group membership.52 The National Gang Center sums 
up this point: 
Risk factors are variables increase the likelihood of the outcome in 
question—in this case, gang membership. Gang research scholars have 
discovered a multitude of risk factors that are statistically linked to gang 
joining. These individual risk factors span the many dimensions in a 
youth’s life and are typically grouped into five categories (called 
“domains”): individual, family, school, peer, and 
neighborhood/community. Importantly, however, these extensive research 
studies have demonstrated that there is no one risk factor (or even domain) 
responsible for gang joining; rather, it is the accumulation of multiple risk 
factors across multiple domains that greatly increases gang joining. Thus, 
put another way, gang joining is not reducible to a single risk factor (e.g., 
single-parent household), since some youth with the risk factor may not 
join a gang, and some youth without the risk factor may join. It is far more 
profitable, then, to assess (and ultimately address) the collection of risk 
factors across the five social domains to prevent gang joining.53 
One purpose of this research is to determine if foreign terrorist organizations are 
similar to domestic street gangs. Its aim is to identify specific risk factors that may 
influence an individual to join one of these the two groups. These risk factors are not 
prerequisites, but may merely increase a person’s likelihood to join a group. According to 
a review of the literature, most people do not join street gangs and/or terrorist 
organizations unless they possess one or more of these risk factors.54 Nonetheless, the 
selected characteristics (identity deprivation, poverty, progression and peer influence) are 
frequently examined and common in research to both groups.  
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B. METHODOLOGY 
The purpose this research is to identify specific risk factors that promote 
membership into gangs and terrorist organization. By discovering these key risk factors, 
law enforcement can develop policies for intervention and prevention based on solid 
research.  
There is vast assortment of domestic street gangs and foreign terrorist 
organizations. To narrow down this data set, this research used biographies of gang 
members and terrorists that have political and ethno-centric components, such as MS-13, 
Crips, Hezbollah and Hamas. Because of these groups’ popularity, there was sufficient 
data for a thorough review.  
There are many characteristics individuals may possess that could increase their 
likelihood to join a deviant group. This research was bound by exploring individual 
characteristics such as poverty, identity deprivation, progression and peer influence. 
These characteristics have been chosen because of their frequency in existing research. 
Examining each characteristic’s influence on both groups helps determine if it is endemic 
to one group or more universal. 
There were several limitations to this research. First, it was not the purpose of this 
research to decide which group is more dangerous to the American people. Second, this 
research presumably falls short of determining why the majority of the people who 
possess these risk factors fail to join a street gang and/or terrorist organization. Whereas 
this research may briefly touch upon these topics it not the purpose to answer these 
questions but perhaps provide a starting point for future inquiry.  
The data was derived from first and secondhand biographies written about gang 
members and terrorists. For example, Raymond Washington was the founder of the 
modern-day street gang named the Crips. There have been numerous biographies written 
about him and his ascension into the gang. More importantly, the biographies provide 
data on Washington’s individual evaluative characteristics. The biographies uncover if 
his socioeconomic status (i.e., poverty) played a role in his decision to start a street gang. 
Similar books written about terrorists by Anne Speckhard and Fathali Moghaddam were 
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also used. Both authors gave detailed accounts on the pedigrees of known terrorists. Such 
information was crucial in determining if these individuals possess the characteristics 
researched.  
The data also came from research and surveys produced by criminologists, 
sociologists, psychologists and terrorist analysts into the characteristics and social 
conditions of members of these groups. Criminologists Malcolm Klein and Cheryl 
Maxson co-authored a book titled Street Gangs: Patterns and Policies in which they 
analyzed surveys conducted by criminologist between the years 1985 and 2001.55 The 
results of their surveys were compared to the results of the research and used to support 
or refute some conclusions.   
The conclusion of this research identifies specific risk factors which may 
influence an individual to join a domestic street gang and/or terrorist organization. These 
risk factors are not endemic to one specific group. Law enforcement can design policies 
and prevention programs that effectively serve both groups. 
C. WHY GANGS, AND WHY NOW? 
In February 2015, the U.S. federal government convened at a three-day summit 
on countering violent extremism (CVE). Their goal was to develop policies and strategies 
to deal with the threats posed by foreign and domestic terrorists. The summit brought 
together local, federal and international leaders to discuss “concrete steps the United 
States and its partners can take to develop community-oriented approaches to counter 
hateful extremist ideologies that radicalize, recruit and incite violence.”56 But this was 
not the U.S. government’s first attempt at such strategy.  
In 2011, the U.S. government released its first-ever national CVE strategy, called 
“Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States.” 
According to this strategy, solutions to violent extremism are best developed at the local 
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level.57 Local communities and governments are better equipped to design prevention 
and intervention programs tailored for their communities to target those most in need. 
Many of these communities already have outreach and community-policing mechanisms 
in place.58 Therefore, the federal government believed its role was to act as a local-
program facilitator rather than a program manager. In addition to the multitude of new 
measures this created, the U.S. government planned to: 
• engage with local partners and strengthen community ties 
• develop a prevention and intervention program framework 
• award $3.5 million dollars to the National Institute of Justice to conduct 
research on the topic (in addition to the $15 million dollars given to the 
Department of Justice to build community resiliency)59 
Horrendous acts of terrorism and the fear and social disorder they create have 
often been used to justify the large expenditure of public funds. This indiscriminate 
violence has been the rationale behind many control policies and prevention programs. 
The success of any prevention and/or intervention program, however, starts with 
targeting appropriate program clients—in this case, terrorists or people on the path to 
radicalization. Any program that engages likely non-joiners can be very costly and highly 
ineffective. Therefore, these types of programs require some form of early identification 
and specific targeting of risk factors that make one more likely to radicalize or join a 
terrorist group. It would also make little sense to develop community-oriented programs 
that have proven ineffective in the past. To help avoid this pitfall, we turn to the study of 
gangs. 
D. DOMESTIC STREET GANGS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR BETTER-
DESIGNED CVE PROGRAMS 
If the U.S. government is looking for community-oriented solutions to criminal 
groups, they need look no further than the study of domestic street gangs. Gangs have 
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been the focus of concern for public officials, community service practitioners and 
researchers for decades. Gang research has a long, rigorous academic history, dating back 
to the 1920s with the work of Dr. Frederic Thrasher. As such, many theories have 
attempted to explain gang membership and offending and delinquent behavior, including 
cultural diffusion, differential association, social disorganization and strain theory. CVE 
program developers may be able to use these theories to explain the behavior of terrorists 
as well. 
Many terrorism theories being used today, such as relative deprivation and social 
identity theory, seem to expand upon gang theories. But the ability to utilize the same 
theories to explain both gangs and terrorist groups should not be the only reason to 
examine this correlation. Gangs have a more global impact than previously thought. 
Understanding street gangs in a global context is crucial in the development of public 
policy.60 Those policies should be designed to reduce membership in these groups and 
the violence they cause.61 To that end, Hagedorn offered six points that support the 
importance of gang study, four of which are relevant to this thesis: 
• Gangs thrive in urban areas. As more and more locations urbanize, there 
will be an increase in gangs. 
• As global economies fail or recede, there will be a shrinking of state-
sponsored social welfare. Gangs can provide for these community 
residents with the proceeds of their crime. 
• People are banning together to resist marginalization. Some people have 
joined gangs as a way of protection against discrimination. 
• Some gangs persist and are staples in many communities. As such, they 
play a major role in those communities’ economic, social and political 
institutions.62 
There are decades of tried and failed community-oriented policies designed to 
reduce gang membership that could serve as a foundation for terrorism research. Those 
policies may not provide a successful way forward, but they may demonstrate merely 
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what not to do. For example, after 9/11, mass media campaigns were undertaken across 
the United States to increase citizens’ awareness of terrorism. Campaigns such as “See 
Something, Say Something” have been highly successful in increasing citizen awareness, 
but are extremely costly; it is estimated that NYNJ Port Authority spends $2 to $3 million 
dollars a year to maintain the program.63 But such awareness may have unintended 
consequences, as seen with street gangs.  
Old studies of crime attributed to street gangs focused on measuring the level of 
fear community members had about becoming victims of gang violence.64 Objective 
levels of crime did not necessarily correlate with peoples’ levels of fear.65 A study of five 
impoverished neighborhoods in San Bernardino, California found that residents’ fear of 
gangs increased when their awareness of gang activity increased.66 Similar studies in 
Orange County, California were conducted, this time focusing on the correlation between 
the deterioration of the neighborhood and gang crime. The study found that peoples’ fear 
of gangs increased when they felt their community was in decline.67 Katz, Webb and 
Armstrong write: 
Fear of gangs is not simply a consequence of, or in direct relation to, an 
objective threat….fear of gangs was unrelated to living in a high-gang 
area, an area in which we know that gang membership is high and in 
which we presume that gang crime is also high.68  
The Orange County study suggests that the government’s program to increase 
community residents’ awareness of gangs had an unintended consequence of 
overinflating their fear of victimization.69 If officials wish to make community residents 
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feel safer, they should design public policy to strengthen and build community 
cohesion.70  
Fast forward to 2010, and the “See Something, Say Something” campaign to 
combat terrorism received similar reviews.71 Some believe the slogan does nothing more 
than raise fear and paranoia in an otherwise safe environment.72 Had the program 
designers looked to the San Bernardino and Orange County studies first, they could have 
avoided the same pitfall. 
Better-designed CVE programs will effectively reduce membership, reduce 
association and increase desistance to terrorist groups. Policies that reduce membership 
will reduce terror incidents. Furthermore, policies based on good research and proven risk 
factors will more effectively prevent group membership. Therefore, research needs to be 
undertaken to identify those risk factors that greatly influence an individual to join a 
terrorist group. Careful attention should also be made to discover which risk factors have 
a greater chance of being manipulated by prevention and intervention efforts. 
Since 9/11, much information about terrorism has been brought to the public eye 
through great authors such as Bruce Hoffman, David Brannan, Anders Strindberg and 
Fathali Moghaddam. It is the hope that this research will lend new direction to the 
developing CVE policies and de-radicalization strategies that are currently underway. 
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The second chapter in this thesis explores identity, and the individual’s struggle 
with obtaining a desirable identity, which often leads to violent organization membership. 
The third chapter discusses poverty, and explains why a person may join a terrorist group 
or street gang if membership helps eliminate the frustration of impoverishment. The 
chapter also explains the role of failing social institutions and the advantages violent 
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organizations provide their members.73 Chapter IV engages the topic of progression, 
which can explain a person’s ascension to commit an act of terror or become a gang 
leader. Chapter V discusses the effect of peer pressure on criminal behavior. Chapter VI 
summarizes the main implications, looking to the policies and strategies developed for 
street gangs to determine if they are a viable model for future CVE programs. The thesis 
concludes in the final chapter that terrorists possess similar characteristics to street gang 
members. As such, the policies, programs and models developed for street gangs over the 
last century should provide CVE policy makers with ample ground on which to develop 
future policies and practices. The research finishes off with some practical policy 
suggestions. 
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II. IDENTITY DEPRIVATION 
Identity is an important ingredient in a person’s personality.74 It is the 
compilation of characteristics belonging to a specific individual that defines and sets him 
or her apart from others.75 Identity tells each of us what kind of person we are in relation 
to others and in relation to other groups.76 In a broader sense, identity can derive from a 
person’s nationality, ethnicity, or religion, and can refer to someone’s values, ethos or 
compassion.77 Identity is not, however, merely how we see ourselves; it is how others see 
us as well.78 An identity crisis arises when a person has trouble developing an identity 
with which he or she is comfortable.79  
This chapter sets out to determine if identity can be considered a common 
characteristic that causes individuals to join their respective groups. It concludes that 
identity issues exist similarly between street gang members and terrorists, despite the vast 
differences between both groups. 
A. ERICK ERIKSON’S STAGES OF IDENTITY 
One of the most influential psychoanalysts on identity was Erik Erikson.80 He 
studied in the field of developmental psychology, which explains how people mentally 
develop throughout their lives.81 Erikson believed a person’s identity develops from their 
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learned interaction with others.82 According to Erikson, identity is not static; it changes 
and evolves over time as we learn from the teachings and values of our parent(s), and 
then as we are exposed to different people and environments.83  
Erikson postulated identity develops along the path of eight predetermined stages, 
in which individuals are faced with conflicts to resolve before progressing to the next 
stage.84 These conflicts typically stem from a person’s interactions with others.85 
Through the resolution of these conflicts, the person obtains attributes or virtues that 
contribute to the development of identity.86 Once a person obtains enough attributes, he 
or she can function as a successful adult—a person who can be intimate with others and 
share his or her life while still retaining a distinct identity.87 When a person fails to 
resolve a conflict, his or her development stalls. This was Erikson’s idea of an identity 
crisis, which  typically occurs around the time a person attempts to answer questions like: 
What kind of person am I? What is my place in society? What is my role?88 Answers are 
sought through interaction with others.89 If the interactions are successful, the individual 
begins to build relationships; if they are not, the individual falls into a period of “role 
confusion.”90  
Role confusion occurs when a person feels lost, unsure of what kind of person he 
or she is, or of where he or she belongs in society.91 Erikson explains this further in his 
fifth stage of development: “identity achievement versus role confusion.92 Arguably 
Erikson’s most important stage of development, identity achievement versus role 
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confusion usually occurs at the onset of adolescence.93 It is a time when a person begins 
to learn the different roles he or she plays in life—sibling, student, boyfriend, etc. 
Whatever the role and regardless how many, the person needs to successfully integrate 
them all into one constant role.94 Gross writes:  
What is unique about this stage of identity is that it is a special sort of 
synthesis of earlier stages and a special sort or anticipation of later ones. 
Youth has a certain unique quality in a person’s life; it is a bridge between 
childhood and adulthood. Youth is a time of radical change- the great 
body changes accompanying puberty, the ability of the mind to search 
one’s own intentions and the intentions of others, the suddenly sharpened 
awareness of the roles society has offered for later life.95 
People at this stage are trying to establish who they are as individuals and who 
they are in relation to the community around them.96 This can be a challenging time for 
those who are not comfortable with their self-identified roles, or the roles society has 
envisioned for them.97 If a person does not successfully progress through this stage, they 
cannot move on to the next stage, which is intimacy.98 An identity crisis results.99 For 
this research, we consider: Are terrorists asking themselves, “what kind of person am I?” 
B. NATIONALITY’S ROLE IN IDENTITY 
In Anne Speckhard’s book Talking to Terrorists, she conducts one-on-one 
interviews with people progressing along paths of radicalization to terrorism. She 
interviewed a young teenager named Jamal who was slowly becoming radicalized against 
his home country of Belgium.100 Jamal, a Muslim of Moroccan decent, faced increased 
discrimination by the majority population in Belgium, which consists largely of white 
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Christian Europeans.101 Nationality is a major characteristic in developing one’s identity; 
the symbolic value alone from nationality-derived identity is sufficient reason for some 
people to go to war.102 The inability to subscribe to a nationality may cause an identity 
crisis. When Speckhard asked Jamal which nationality he considered himself, he 
responded,  
I am Belgian. I was born here. I have both Belgian and Moroccan 
passports. But in Morocco people say “Go away Belgian guy” Here 
(Belgium) they tell me “Go away Moroccan! We lack identity.103  
The discrimination from the majority population of both Belgium and Morocco 
caused an identity crisis for Jamal. He was unable to identify as a Belgian because of his 
Moroccan descent, but he could also not identify with the people of Morocco either, 
because he was born in Belgium. In an effort to resolve this conflict, Jamal sought a 
group to which he could belong. Unfortunately, he found such resolution in a terrorist 
organization. The terrorist group became his foundational identity.  
Jamal’s experience is similar to that of immigrants who join gangs. The United 
States is a country of immigrants, made up of people from all over the world who have 
had to overcome prejudice and discrimination by the citizens of their new country.104 
Criminologists who study domestic street gangs have long realized that immigrants 
coming into the United States are far more likely to fall prey to street gangs, especially 
ethnic street gangs, than native American citizens.105 A new country can have a different 
language, culture, customs, and religions. In an effort to feel more comfortable with their 
new surroundings, immigrants tend to seek out people and groups with whom they share 
similarities.  
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One of the more popular immigrant gangs in the Unites States is Mara 
Salvatrucha, or MS-13.106 MS-13 is an extremely violent Salvadorian street gang from 
the Pico-Union section of Central Los Angles.107 It was originally formed to provide its 
members with protection from other Hispanic street gangs.108 This protection is a 
positive value the gang provides its members. However, Alex Sanchez, an admitted gang 
member, believed the gang gave its members much more. He recounts: 
I was MS-13 and yes, there was some dangerous characters there but that 
is not the whole story. People have come to us because they want to 
belong somewhere, because they felt safe, because the system didn’t 
provide the structure that immigrants needed.109    
Salvadorian immigrants migrating to California found familiar ties with MS-13, 
which made the group attractive. It provided its members a structure and means to 
survive in their new environment, and offered acceptance, a sense of companionship and 
family. These positive values enhance a person’s self-esteem and entice immigrants to 
join. 
Jamal and Alex had similar challenges with identity. Both believed they were out-
group members in the communities in which they lived. The terrorist organization and 
street gang provided the boys with an in-group, which made them feel safer in their 
communities and provided them both an identity and situational advantages (i.e., security 
over non-members). These group dynamics are better explained through a theory call 
social identity theory (SIT). 
C. SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY 
First developed in 1970s by psychologists Henri Tajfel and John Turner, SIT 
postulates a person’s identity is conceived, in part, through his or her membership in a 
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particular group. The individual adopts an identity put forth by the group and the 
individual’s behavior becomes governed by intra-group politics. Tajfel explains: 
SIT is part of an individual’s self-concept derived from his or her 
knowledge of membership of a social group or groups including the value 
and emotional significance the individual gets from being a member in 
that group.110  
The first step in SIT is the idea of self-categorization. This is simply placing 
oneself in a particular category or group to which the person believes he or she is 
similar.111 This is the person’s in-group. The individual, once in the group, then self-
categorizes as having similar characteristics to the other group members. “What kind of 
person am I?,” the group member asks himself; “I am like other members of the group.” 
This self-categorization also affects behavior; once a person identifies as part of a group, 
he or she will start to imitate the behavior of other group members.112  
SIT also explains that people want to enhance their social status and self-
esteem.113 A group member’s self-esteem is tied to the status and identity of the group, 
so groups strive to provide their members with a positive distinctiveness.114 If the group 
cannot do so or if it deflates a member’s self-esteem, the member may leave or join 
another group.115 
Once a person identifies with a particular in-group, there is a strong desire for that 
person to compare him or herself to members of other groups.116  If the person does not 
feel he is faring better than members of other groups, he may seek to leave the group.117 
An example of this group dynamic occurred with Hezbollah and the Amal Movement. 
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1. Hezbollah and the Amal Movement 
In the late 1980s, two terrorist organizations, Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, 
were competing for Shia members in Lebanon.118 Both groups had similar ideologies and 
group compositions. Hezbollah, however, was able to offer its members a better military, 
a better regional standing and more state support from Iran.119 Therefore, the group 
enticed more members.  
Amal Movement members, recognizing their inferiority in comparison to 
Hezbollah, had a clear incentive to leave their in-group. After all, their self-esteem and 
their self-worth were attached to a lesser identity. Subsequently, many Amal members 
left and joined Hezbollah.120 This group dynamic exists for gangs as well. 
2. Crips and Bloods 
In the late 1960s, several former Black Panther Party members started a street 
gang called the “Avenue Cribs” in the South Side of Los Angles. Eventually, this new 
gang evolved into the modern-day Crips gang. At the time, there were many smaller 
localized gangs operating on the streets of Los Angles, but the Crips’ larger size provided 
its members with greater protection and resources.121 The gang’s powerful size and 
brutal reputation, however, would eventually lead to its fractioning.  
In 1972, several Crips members left the gang because it had become too 
violent.122 A fraction of the group felt the gang’s extreme violence was causing them to 
develop a negative reputation.123 Eventually, negative attitudes toward this violent 
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identity outweighed the protection the gang was able to provide.124 A few members left 
the group to form their own gang, called the Piru Bloods, a name they took from Piru 
Street—the street where the gang first started.125 Much like Amal, once the Crips 
members’ self-esteem diminished, they left the group.126 
The group identity supplied by the Crips, Bloods, MS-13 and Hezbollah offered 
members a particular identity. It helped them identify what kind of people they were, 
providing a social identity based on group membership. For those who do not join a 
group, however, a process called “identity foreclosure” may provide a better explanation. 
D. IDENTITY FORECLOSURE 
Identity researcher and psychologist James Marcia expanded upon Erikson’s work 
and introduced a stage of identity development called “identity foreclosure.”127 Put 
simply, foreclosing on an identity occurs when an individual adopts an already 
constructed identity rather than fashioning his or her own.128 There is no exploration on 
the part of the individual—no periods of re-thinking, sorting through and/or trying on 
various roles.129 The person chooses or accepts an identity that is pre-fabricated. The 
individual does not necessarily have to join a group for this to occur.  
1. Raymond Martinez 
Raymond Martinez, a gang member from Fresno, California is serving a life 
sentence for murder, which he committed when he was just 16 years old. He explains 
how he developed his identity: 
[My] reason for joining the gang was because my older brother was 
already a gang member. I looked up to him because he was respected 
within the gang and considered a leader. Since he was someone I looked 
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up to, I felt it was my duty to be like him and copy his idea of manhood—
even if it meant following in his risky footsteps.130 
Raymond has spent his time in prison trying to discover who he really is. He 
recounts not taking the time early on in life to explore who he wanted to be. He was 
looking for an identity others would respect.131 Rather than pause to think about what 
kind of person he wanted to be, or to explore his options, he simply copied or 
“foreclosed” on the identity of his brother. 
In an environment overrun with gang members, there may be few available 
positive role models for someone like Raymond. A gang may be the most enticing or 
easiest option. Imitating or adopting a family member’s identity is not exclusive to street 
gangs; terrorists have done the same. 
2. Yacoub and the Dubrovka Theatre Massacre 
On October 23, 2002, forty armed Chechens from the Special Purpose Islamic 
Regiment (SPIR), the International Islamic Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB) and the 
Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs took over 
800 hostages inside the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow.132 The terrorist attack ended with 
the death of all 40 terrorists and over 129 hostages.133  
One such terrorist was named Yacoub.134 Yacoub progressed along a path of 
radicalization starting with the death of his father and older brother, both of whom were 
killed fighting the Russians in 1995, when he was only 15 years old. Though his 
radicalized family members had passed, Yacoub still foreclosed on the family identity. 
Yacoub’s cousin explains: 
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[Yacoub] became very closed and gloomy saying that he should avenge 
his family members…Then he began to be interested in religion although 
he didn’t even know how to pray. His mother was very much afraid of 
these changes that occurred in him so quickly. But she no longer had 
influence over him…After his father’s death, our extremist uncle was the 
biggest authority for my cousin. He started to read the wahhabists’ books 
that he took from his uncle. He changed externally, grew his hair long and 
grew a beard. Then he went to Khattab (Saudi born rebel leader in the 
terrorist camp) in the Jaamat, a group where his uncle was included.135  
Full of anger and wanting revenge, Yacoub adopted the identity of his uncle, his 
last remaining adult role model. Unfortunately, his uncle was a violent extremist whose 
in-group was a terrorist organization. This identity provided Yacoub his desired path to 
revenge.136 
Raymond wanted respect, Yacoub wanted revenge, and both foreclosed on an 
identity that was able to deliver. 
E. NEGATIVE IDENTITY 
Society plays a major role in labeling both certain behaviors and certain groups as 
“good” or “bad.” Not all societies, however, are alike. What is labeled bad in one society 
may be good in another.137 If we accept the notion that joining a street gang or terrorist 
organization is bad across most societies, why do individuals decide to do so anyway, 
especially considering a negative identity’s ability to diminish self-esteem? 
Psychologist and behavioral scientist Jeanne Knutsen recognized the difficulty of 
choosing a negative identity. She postulates that an individual may adopt a negative 
identity if he or she believes the path to a positive identity is blocked.138 With a positive 
identity unattainable, the person is left with two choices: accept a failed identity, which 
leads to a devalued self-image, or take on the most easily attainable identity, which could 
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be a negative one.139 By adopting a negative identity, the person avoids inner 
fragmentation or an identity crisis.140 Erikson agrees, suggesting that a person will adopt 
a negative identity rather than go without an identity at all; a person has to have an 
identity, positive or negative, to progress in life.141 
F. SUMMARY 
Identity is a compilation of evolving characteristics that compose a person’s 
personality.142 Before one can be happy and co-mingle with others, one must achieve a 
foundational identity; if one cannot, the result is an identity crisis, which can be relieved 
through association with a group.143 People will choose an in-group that provide them 
with some sort of positive value.144 Conversely, they will leave in-groups if the group 
provides them with negative value, as was the case with the Amal Movement terrorists. 
Furthermore, when a person does not explore different roles and merely adopts an already 
developed identity, that person is said to be “foreclosing” on an identity.145 An individual 
can take on an identity without officially joining a group and/or participating in intra-
group activities.146 This was the case for Raymond Martinez, who adopted the identity of 
his brother, a street gang member, and Yacoub, who adopted the identity of his uncle, a 
terrorist. Finally, a person will adopt a negative identity—such as a terrorist or gang 
member—if he or she perceives the path to a positive identity is blocked or 
unattainable.147 A person will adopt a negative identity rather than possess a less 
satisfying one or no identity at all.148  
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Each of the street gang members and terrorists described in this chapter had 
similar experiences with identity. It can therefore be said that identity and the problems 
associated with its development are common between street gang members and terrorists. 
 29 
III. POVERTY 
When thinking about poverty, the word “money” immediately comes to mind.149 
But poverty, more broadly, simply means “lacking,” which could refer to material 
possessions or even to social conditions such as respect or status.150 Research over the 
last few decades has focused on determining if a lack of material possessions is a risk 
factor for people joining street gangs, which typically exist in socioeconomically poor 
areas; in fact, street gangs are considered a staple in every metropolitan city in the United 
States, and they tend to flourish in the poorer parts of those cities.151 Just because 
somebody is poor, however, does not mean that he or she will join a street gang.152 So 
socioeconomic poverty alone cannot explain gang membership.  
This chapter sets out to determine to what extent poverty motivates people to join 
violent groups such as street gangs and terrorist organizations. The chapter also discusses 
environments in which street gangs and terrorist organizations thrive based on their 
ability to provide scarce resources. Ultimately, the chapter concludes that some street 
gang members and terrorists similarly join their respective groups to meet needs.153 
A. RELATIVE DEPRIVATION THEORY 
Relative deprivation theory posits that people feel deprived when they compare 
their situations to others’.154 The specific deprivation is subjective to the individual; it 
can be money, beauty, a new job, or any number of animate or inanimate things.155 
Moghaddam writes: “Relative deprivation…is how individuals feel about their situation 
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relative to particular others, how deprived they feel subjectively and in a comparative 
sense, rather than how they are doing according to objective criteria.”156 For example, 
you may like your car, but when you look across to your neighbor’s driveway and see a 
shiny, expensive, new car, your own car is now a beat-up old clunker. You start 
developing feelings of deprivation, believing that you deserve or are entitled to a new car, 
just like your neighbor, leading to frustration. 
Breaking it down further, Runciman outlined two types of deprivation: egoistic 
and fraternalistic.157 Egositic relative deprivation is a personal feeling of having less 
compared to similar individuals.158 Fraternalistic deprivation is the same feeling of 
having less, but toward a similarly situated group rather than an individual.159 
B. STRAIN THEORY 
Strain Theory expands upon relative deprivation theory to account for 
frustration.160 Advanced by Robert Merton, strain theory postulates that society has 
perceived goals for its members, who are under a “strain” to accomplish those goals.161 
To help alleviate that strain, society has created socially accepted ways in which to 
accomplish those goals.162  
One such way to reach societal goals is to conform.163 People under strain can 
accept the defined goals of their culture and also the socially accepted ways to 
accomplish them. For example, if a person’s goal is to become a doctor, the person will 
accept going to medical school in order to become one. The goal—and the means 
necessary to reach it—are accepted.  
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Another way is to innovate. The person can accept culturally defined goals, but 
reject the socially accepted ways in which to accomplish them, forging his or her own 
path to success.164 For example, a person’s goal may be to own a new, expensive car. 
Society may dictate the person to secure a good-paying job, allowing the individual to 
save up for the car. But the person may also accept the goal of getting a new car but reject 
the notion of having to work; instead, he or she they may innovate by selling illegal 
narcotics to gain the funds, or by stealing the car.  
Yet another option is to rebel. In this case, the person not only rejects society’s 
goals but also rejects any socially acceptable means in which to accomplish those goals. 
Instead, those who rebel elect to form their own goals and develop their own means to 
achieve them.165    
Regardless of the behavior pattern, if a person believes his or her goals are 
blocked or unattainable, frustration will set in. The person will then seek mechanisms to 
alleviate that frustration.166 If a gang or terrorist group presents itself as an appropriate 
mechanism, then it reasonable that someone experiencing deprivation may look to 
join.167  
In the article “Gangs: ‘We Want Money,’” street gang members around Ann 
Arbor, Michigan were asked what drew them to gang life. Gang member No.6 explained: 
It’s just a hustle. We’re just out here making money. I want a nice steady 
job, maybe out in a factory somewhere where I can make some money. 
(But) The honkeys (white people) got all the money- the honkeys and the 
Arabs got all the money, we just trying to get some money.168 
Gang member No.6 felt economically deprived compared to the white and Arab 
people in his community; they had all the jobs, and so No. 6 was forced to look 
elsewhere. Gangs can act like unconventional businesses, generating money for their 
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members mostly through illegal activities.169 No.6 accepted society’s socially accepted 
ways to make money, but this avenue was blocked. So he innovated and joined a gang to 
accomplish his goal.  
Many gang members are from poor families.170 Some desire to have expensive 
things like trendy clothes, fancy cars and big houses.171 Coming from a poor family may 
affect their ability to purchase these items, but it does not diminish the items’ allure. 
Jankowski describes a trait he calls “defiant individualism,” in which a defiant individual 
is a person who will become involved with making money, regardless of legality, and 
will thwart any attempt to stop him.172   
There is a scarcity of resources in poorer communities, and the people who live in 
these communities know they have to be aggressive to compete and secure them.173 The 
question then becomes, does participation in a gang provide a material advantage in 
securing those resources? Slump, a 16-year-old gang banger from Los Angeles, described 
this battle for resources:  
Well, I really didn’t want to join the gang when I was a little younger 
because I had this idea that I could make more money if I would do some 
gigs (illegal activity to make money) on my own. Now I don’t know, I 
mean, I wasn’t wrong. I could make more money on my own, but there are 
more things happening with the gang, so it’s a little more even in terms of 
when the money comes in…Let’s just say there is more possibilities for a 
more steady amount of income if you need it.174  
In an effort to increase his socio-economic status, Slump calculated the benefits of 
joining versus not joining. Although he could have made more money on his own, the 
gang provided him more opportunities for him to do so, and so he decided to join. 
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A similar example can be found in Hamas—a Palestinian Islamic terrorist 
organization with a deep resentment toward Israel for taking their land and making the 
Palestinians refugees.175 Many Palestinians consider the land of Israel their rightful 
homeland. Ziad al Fahudi, a Palestinian member of Hamas, and his son, Fadi Ziad al 
Fahudi, along with 15 other members of the Jihad Mosque soccer team conducted a 
terrorist attack in the Israeli settlement of Hebron.176 On March 8, 2003, Fadi snuck past 
Israeli security forces and began shooting Jewish settlers.177 When the security forces 
moved in, Fadi blew himself up with improvised explosives. According to authorities, 
Fadi was responsible for the death of five settlers before he committed suicide.178 
These terrorists wanted a homeland. They felt deprived of a homeland by Jewish 
settlers.179 In retaliation, they conducted a series of bombings. The “strain” caused by 
Fadi Ziad al Fahudi’s unmet need, coupled with his belief that the Jewish settlers were 
blocking his ability to satisfy this need, led him to violence.  
C. SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION 
Territory affects people in other ways as well. Socially disorganized communities 
can be described as those with ineffective educational systems, high unemployment, 
weak governance and weak community cohesion.180 An ecological theory of gangs was 
first presented by one of the earliest street gang researchers, Dr. Frederick Thrasher. He 
wrote:  
Gangs present the spontaneous effort of boys to create a society for 
themselves where none adequate to their needs exist…The failure of 
normally directing and controlling customs and institutions to function 
efficiently in the boy’s experience is indicated by disintegration of family 
life, inefficiency of schools, formalism and externality of religion…All 
these factors enter into the picture of the moral and economic frontier, and, 
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coupled with deterioration in housing, sanitation, and other conditions of 
life in the slum, give the impression of general disorganization and decay. 
The gang functions with reference to these conditions in two ways: It 
offers a substitute for what society fails to give…It fills a gap and affords 
an escape…Thus, the gang, itself a natural and spontaneous type of 
organization arising through conflict, is a symptom of disorganization in 
the larger social framework.181  
In his study of the various street gangs in Chicago, Thrasher concluded that 
people join street gangs as a direct reaction to the problems faced in their environments. 
The gangs provide their members with mechanisms to survive where social institutions 
have failed. 
Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay later expanded upon Thrasher’s concept and 
developed a theory called social disorganization, in which they attempted to link 
individual delinquency to socially disorganized communities.182 According to their 
theory, the cause of delinquency shifted away from the individual and was placed solely 
on the person’s neighborhood.183 Delinquency, they argued, is just a normal response to a 
person’s environment. Shaw and McKay furthermore found that areas dense with people 
of lower economic status, poor policing, ineffective educational systems, high 
immigration and corruption, all had street gangs.184 To them, this was no coincidence. 
One thing all these areas had in common was the lack of resources, which created 
competition among residents.185 If local governance is unable to adequately satisfy 
people’s needs, disorganization will ensue; people will seek opportunities—illegal, if 
need be—to satisfy their needs.186  
Prior to World War II, for example, street gangs as we see them today did not exist in Los 
Angeles.187 Many black families migrated from southern rural towns in search of greener 
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pastures in California’s booming aerospace, automobile and construction industries. 
What they found when they got there was all but the “American Dream.”188 Many found 
themselves locked out of jobs that were dominated by a white middle class. They were 
racially discriminated against and alienated from the old social values that had sustained 
their previous generations. By the mid-1950s, unemployment among black men jumped 
to 30 percent.189 The social institutions of Los Angeles began to crumble under the 
weight of migrants, many of whom were uneducated and unemployed.  
In response, black youths began to band together into small gangs with names 
such as Slausons, Gladiators, Watts, Flips and Rebel Rousers.190 These gangs’ original 
purpose was to defend against other racial and ethnic gangs, but they soon became 
economic providers for their members.191 These groups thrived and expanded because 
the city’s social institutions were unable to provide adequate resources to community 
members. The City of Los Angeles was also feckless in combating these gangs directly as 
well.  
If socially disorganized communities all have gangs, then one would assume that 
socially well-organized communities should not. But do they? Sociologist William Julius 
Wilson conducted an analysis of the street gangs on the south side of Chicago in the 
1940s.192 At the time, the south side was a poor, mostly black urban area with a large 
number of street gangs. Despite these rising attributes, it was discovered that the 
community showed no increase in crime and gang activity.193 Wilson reasoned that the 
south side of Chicago was still socially well-organized at the time.194 It still had strong 
economic and social institutions that created strong social controls; this thwarted an 
increase in crime and gang activity.195 Wilson’s conclusions showed a correlation 
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between lower delinquency rates and higher social organization. However, the south side 
of Chicago still had a large number of gangs. His analysis did not determine why an 
individual would seek to join a gang, but it did prove people still join gangs despite living 
in socially organized communities.  
Like Los Angeles, some areas in the Middle East provide fertile ground for 
violent groups to thrive. Take, for example, Iraq. Since Saddam Hussein was ousted in 
2003 by coalition forces, Iraq has struggled to develop and sustain basic functions of 
governance and social institutions.196 This failure has caused disorganization in the 
country and spawned the emergence of terrorist groups.197 One such group is the Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant, more commonly known as ISIS198 As Iraq was trying to 
establish a basic system of governance, ISIS built its strength and popularity in the Iraqi 
governorates of Baghdad, Al Anbar and Diyala. ISIS did not form primarily to compete 
for resources, but to assemble and establish an Islamic Caliphate.199 ISIS grew in stature 
as the fragile Iraqi government suffered from political unrest and the evaporation of an 
effective military.200 Iraq’s disorganized government was unable to stop the emergence 
of this terrorist group. The group proliferated throughout the country, eventually 
spreading all the way to Syria.201 
D. JOHNNY “MAD DOG” ADAIR 
Social disorganization theory also played a role in the making of Irish terrorist 
Johnny Adair. Better known as “Mad Dog,” Adair was an Irish-born political terrorist 
from the Ulster Freedom Fighters, which was the para-military wing of the Ulster 
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Defense Association.202 The organization was created in response to attacks on 
Protestants by the Irish Republican Army.203  
Adair grew up in Belfast—an Irish neighborhood engulfed in political violence. 
The area where Adair was raised was poor and residents there were indifferent to 
crime.204 Prior to 1969, Belfast was experiencing “an unprecedented period of joy and 
happiness.”205 During this time, Adair was an ordinary boy, going to school and 
attending Sunday church services. It was not until Adair entered secondary school that 
the area around him started to change for the worse. As Adair entered his teenage years, 
petty crime, daily riots and fights broke out between Protestants and Catholics in his 
neighborhood.206 Natasha Smith believes that “if Adair was not subjected to these 
conditions, or his social environment positively changed, his behavior could have been 
exceedingly different.”207  
Social disorganization theory favors environmental characteristics that influence 
delinquent behavior over individual behaviors. Soon, Adair started to get caught up in the 
delinquency around him. In 1979, at the age of 15, he was arrested and convicted of petty 
theft. One year later he was arrested again for disorderly behavior.208 As the 
neighborhood around him changed, so did Adair’s behavior. After years of participating 
in terrorism throughout Ulster, Adair was eventually exiled to Scotland, which had a 
much better socially organized environment. This new positive environment led Adair to 
leave the life of terrorism.209 
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E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Most people who lack material resources, status or reputation do not join gangs or 
terrorist organizations. So poverty alone cannot explain why someone would join such a 
group. Much like Jankoswki’s notion of “defiant individualism,” people will become 
members of a particular group if they believe doing so will help them achieve their 
goals.210 Some street gang members and terrorists join their respective groups because 
they provided them with the mechanisms to achieve their goals. Although joining these 
groups may not be a socially accepted way of doing so, it may be the only realistic means 
available to them.  
It may not be a coincidence that street gangs and terrorist organizations exist in 
some of the most impoverished areas around the world. Poor education systems, high 
unemployment, feckless governments and failing social institutions point toward social 
disorganization, which shifts the attention away from the individual and posits criminal 
behavior.211 When resources are scarce and social and economic institutions are unable 
to provide for residents, they will look elsewhere.212 If street gangs and/or terrorist 
organizations can provide their members with a competitive advantage over non-
members, some people will still join.213 
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Terrorists are not born; they are made.214 For some, the transformation happens 
rapidly. But for others the path to radicalization happens slowly along a progressing set 
of life stages. This chapter explores the path of progression that leads an individual to 
join a street gang or terrorist group, ultimately determining that the progressions are 
similar. 
A. “WAITHOOD” 
I would like to talk to you about a story about a small town kid. I don’t 
know his name but I know his story. He lives in a small village in southern 
Somalia. His village is near Mogadishu. Drought drives the small village 
into poverty and to the brink of starvation. With nothing left for him there, 
he leaves for the big city, in this case, Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. 
When he arrives, there are no opportunities, no jobs, no way forward. He 
ends up living in a tent city on the outskirts of Mogadishu. Maybe a year 
passes, nothing.  
One day, he’s approached by a gentleman who offers to take him to lunch, 
then to dinner, to breakfast. He meets this dynamic group of people, and 
they give him a break. He’s given a bit of money to buy himself some new 
clothes, money to send back home to his family. He is introduced to this 
young woman. He eventually gets married. He starts this new life. He has 
a purpose in life.  
One beautiful day in Mogadishu, under the azure blue sky, a car bomb 
goes off. That small town kid with the big city dreams was the suicide 
bomber, and that dynamic group of people was al Shabaab, a terrorist 
organization linked to al Qaeda.215 
Failed social, economic and governmental institutions can cause stagnation in 
one’s life.216 “Waithood” is a term used by sociologist Alcinda Honwana to explain this 
stagnation in her research with African youth.217 “Waithood,” she says, is a state of 
stagnation, or limbo, between childhood and adulthood, in which many Middle Eastern 
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adolescents are stuck because of failed neo-liberal policies, poor governance and political 
instability in their areas.218 Young males and females are graduating from school only to 
find there are no jobs available to them. Often, their education has failed to prepare them 
for the jobs that are available.219 Many then move to urban centers in hopes of increasing 
their chances of finding employment, only to be embroiled in poverty and despair.220 
Ideas of relative deprivation and social exclusion generate feelings of frustration among 
these people stuck in limbo.221 
The failure of communities and governments to provide positive opportunities has 
caused people to look elsewhere, and terrorist organizations have stepped in to fill this 
void.222 The longer the period of “waithood,” the more susceptible these people are to 
join such groups.223  
Middle Eastern adolescents are not the only ones who feel they are in limbo after 
graduating from school.224 Donte, a street gang member from San Diego, California, his 
reasoning for joining a gang:  
What do I do once I get out of school? You know? I did my daily deed to 
keep from getting thrown out the house, but now I’m walking around the 
neighborhood and I don’t have anything to do.225 
Donte and the boy in Ali’s story are both stuck in “waithood.” They are searching for an 
opportunity to progress in life. Donte joined a gang because that was the only group that 
offered him an opportunity to move out of a stalled life. 
According to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs theory, people have five basic human 
needs they must satisfy to successfully evolve and be happy: biology, safety, love, self-
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esteem and self-actualization.226 Seen as a pyramid, this theory places biology on the 
bottom tier and self-actualization at the top. Self-actualization refers to the pinnacle state 
in which a person reaches his/his or her full potential.227 The people in “waithood” 
cannot reach self-actualization, because they are stuck between safety and esteem. In this 
stratus, they are looking for financial security and the ability to marry, raise a family and 
finally garnish the respect that comes with obtaining those things.228  
B. THE STAIRCASE TO TERRORISM 
Similar theories have been created specifically for terrorists. One such theory is 
Dr. Fathali Moghaddam’s staircase to terrorism.229 Dr. Moghaddam explains his model:  
I have used the metaphor of a narrowing staircase leading to the terrorist 
act at the top of a building. The staircase leads to higher and higher floors, 
and whether a person remains on a particular floor depends on the doors 
and spaces that person imagines to be open to him or her on that floor. The 
fundamentally important feature of the situation is not only the actual 
number of floors, stairs, rooms and so on, but how people perceive the 
building and the doors they think are open to them. As individuals climb 
the staircase, they see fewer choices, until the only possible outcome is the 
destruction of others, oneself, or both.230  
The majority of people begin on the ground floor, where some experience relative 
deprivation in regards to material resources.231 Perceptions of unfairness, injustice and 
unfair treatment can lead to frustration and resentment. According to Moghaddam, only a 
small number of people will leave the ground floor and climb the staircase. Each of the 
next steps will include fewer and fewer people. Only a very small number of people will 
eventually reach the top and commit a terrorist act.232 
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Those wishing to improve their situations climb to the first floor.233 On this floor, 
an individual searches for solutions.234 A person’s perception of available options 
becomes important; if a person believes there is an adequate remedy to his or her 
situation, then the person will remain on that floor.235 If not, frustration and resentment 
will continue to build, especially if the individual begins to blame others for not being 
able to satisfy his or her own needs.236 When this level of frustration produces feelings of 
aggression, the individual ascends to the third floor, where he or she becomes 
sympathetic toward violent extremist ideology.237 A person continues to climb the 
staircase until he or she joins a terrorist group and/or commits an act of terror.238 
Moghaddam’s model is exemplified in the case of Timothy McVeigh—the 
terrorist responsible for the deadly bombing of the Federal Alfred P. Murray building in 
Oklahoma City in 1995.239 After graduating from high school in 1986, McVeigh attended 
a local two-year business college for computing. His high school classmates believed him 
to be their “most promising computer programmer.”240 In 1988, McVeigh joined the 
United States Army because he wanted to work on his survival skills.241 By every 
account, McVeigh’s time in the Army was successful. He scored well on his tests and 
was selected for an experimental program called Cohesion, Operation Readiness and 
Training. He entered Special Forces training in September of 1988 and, during the first 
Iraqi War, achieved the rank of sergeant and received four awards, including the Army 
Commendation Medal.242 After his time fighting, McVeigh finally got a chance to 
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compete for a Special Forces position. Unfortunately, he was deemed not physically or 
mentally ready for the assignment; he was overlooked and not selected for assignment.243  
McVeigh, forced to return to his position at Fort Riley, became bitter and 
frustrated toward the Army; as these feelings grew, they extended to the U.S. government 
as a whole. By the end of 1991, he left the Army with an honorary discharge.244When 
McVeigh returned home to live with his father in Pendleton, New York, he thought the 
skills he received in the military and high school would translate into a good-paying job, 
but he was wrong. Unable to find work in computer programming, he took a low-wage 
security guard position.245 To make ends meet, he went back to work part-time in the 
military. McVeigh resented having to work for a government he now hated.246  
McVeigh felt his life was stalled, as though he was “moving backwards, not 
forwards.”247 Eventually, he had a nervous breakdown, and he continually blamed the 
government for his plight. He resigned from the military, left his father’s house and 
began looking for a state with minimal government oversight and low taxes. He began 
writing anti-government letters to newspapers and congressmen, voicing his displeasure. 
McVeigh’s paranoia toward the U.S. government began to get out of control. Eventually, 
he joined the Patriot Movement, an anti-government organization that supported citizen 
militias, as a means to channel his aggression and as an outlet for his fear. His frustration, 
hatred and aggression ultimately would lead him to commit a terrorist act that killed 168 
people, including 19 children attending nursery school.248  
Timothy McVeigh started out on the ground floor. He became bitter and 
frustrated with the U.S. government after not being selected to enter the Army’s Special 
Forces. His frustration continued to build when he moved in with his father and was 
unable to find employment as a computer programmer. To make ends meet, he had to 
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reluctantly rejoin the military. In an attempt to better his situation (progress to the second 
step), McVeigh left his father’s house in search of a state with less government oversight. 
As his bitterness and frustration against the U.S. government grew, McVeigh joined an 
anti-government group (the third step), and eventually climbed the stairs until he became 
a terrorist. 
C. FIVE-STAGE GANG PROGRESSION MODEL 
Progression theories and models have been developed for street gang members as 
well as terrorists. Dr. Matthew O’Dean, in his book Gang Injunctions and Abatement, 
provided a model of progression for street gang members.249 According to O’Dean, an 
individual starts out as being sympathetic to gang life. He or she then loosely associates 
with gang members. Eventually the cohesion gets stronger, culminating with the person 
becoming a gang leader.250 O’Dean described this as occurring in five stages: 
(1) Stage 1: At-Risk or Peripheral. People involved at this stage are not 
considered gang members, but they know and associate with known gang 
members intermittently. At this stage, the person may idolize gang life and 
wish to emulate it, but his or her behavior has not yet changed enough to 
pursue membership.251  
(2) Stage 2: Associates and Affiliates. Individuals begin to progress toward 
the gang lifestyle, but do not officially join a gang.252 In this stage, the 
person starts associating with gang members on a regular basis. They 
consider gang life normal and acceptable. These types of associates are 
sometimes called “wannabes,” “peewees” or “tiny gangsters.”253  
(3) Stage 3: Gang Members. The budding gang member now begins hanging 
out exclusively with other gang members. Sometimes he or she even 
excludes relationships with people outside the gang.254 At this stage, new 
members of the gang begin participating in group activities including 
                                                 







delinquency and crime. Individuals typically “reject authority and society” 
in general and wish only to achieve further status in the gang.255 
(4) Stage 4: Hard-Core Gang Members. Gang members at this stage are 
fully committed to the gang and gang activities. They are called “OG’s” or 
“Original Gangsters.”256 Their lives become centered on the gang lifestyle 
and the values of the gang. They will commit any crime to further the 
goals and objectives of the gang.257  
(5) Stage 5: Gang Leaders. Finally, the gang member reaches the pinnacle of 
the gang and becomes its leader. Gang leaders garner the most respect, 
direct the gang’s activities, control recruitment and can even decide who 
stays in the gang.258 
Sanyika Shakur, also known as “Monster Kody Scott,” is a self-admitted gang 
leader of the modern-day Crip-Eight Trays gang. He recounts his sixteen years as a street 
gang member in his book, Monster: The Autobiography of an L.A. Gang Member. 
Shakur, aligning with O’Dean’s model, believed his ascension to a leadership position of 
the gang was a progression from “little homie to O.G.”259 
Shakur started his progression when he was only 14 years old, loosely hanging 
around Eight Tray Gang (ETG) members. He was full of “ambition, vitality, and 
ruthlessness to succeed.”260 Although not officially an ETG, he hung around at the 
Rosecrans Skating Rink in Los Angeles, where other gang members would congregate to 
“promote their name and set (ETG).”261  As time went on, Shakur began hanging out 
exclusively with other gang members. Less than a year later, he was involved in 
shootings and petty crime for the gang.262 At the age of 19, Shakur recounts: 
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For the past five years I had gotten up every morning and ironed my gear 
[gang clothing] with thoughts of nothing else but doing propaganda for the 
set. I did this with all the zeal of a religious fanatic.263  
In 1991, twelve years after starting his progression as a gang member, Shakur was 
arrested and convicted for murder in the brutal slaying of a rival crack dealer.264 He was 
sentenced to seven years in prison, successfully progressing along O’Dean’s model.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
People are not born street gang members or terrorists; they join their respective 
groups through a progression or staircase.265 Adolescents can be stuck in “waithood,” 
when failed social, economic and government institutions are not providing for them.266 
Some adolescents become frustrated and join a terrorist organization or gang because 
they are the only groups that offer them a way out of this stagnation.267 Based upon the 
theories and examples described in this chapter, some street gang members and terrorists 
progress similarly into their respective groups. 
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V. PEER INFLUENCE 
One of the consistent predictors of group membership is the influence of peers.268 
If peer behavior is negative, even criminal, then there is a high probability the 
individual’s behavior will be negative as well.269 Additionally, peer networks and peer 
influences have been shown to be consistent characteristics of group membership.270 This 
chapter explores how peer influence similarly affects membership in both street gangs 
and terrorist organizations. 
A. BACKGROUND 
People grow and learn through interaction with others starting at birth.271 Those 
we view as similar to ourselves (whether through abilities, pedigrees, backgrounds, 
socioeconomic status or other attributes) we call peers.272 Some common peers are 
family, friends, schoolmates and neighbors. Put simply, a peer is someone we could 
consider equal to ourselves in some way or another.273  
Peers create a condition known as peer pressure, which refers to “influence 
exerted by an individual or group that encourages others to change their attitudes, values 
or behaviors to conform to the groups’.”274 The individual does not necessarily have to 
agree with the group, but the pressure to conform is so strong the individual gives in.275 
Peer pressure can be positive or negative depending on what it is the individual is being 
encouraged to do. For example, if the goal is for a student to get good grades, having 
peers who influence the student to do better in school would represent a positive form of 
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peer pressure. On the other hand, strong empirical evidence supports the claim that an 
individual who has substance-abusing peers has a high probability of also abusing.276 In 
fact, substance abusing peers are the strongest predictor of substance abuse among 
individuals than any other factor.277  
Although peer pressure exists for people of all ages, it is typically strongest 
among young adolescents, when it manifests itself in appearances, style, ideology and 
values.278 Some contend peer pressure diminishes over time because, as a person gets 
older, he or she becomes less reliant on others.279 But researchers have not discovered 
any approximate age when this begins.280 And although many consider peer pressure a 
thing for kids, it can occur at any age.281 While people may leave gangs as they get older 
and the immaturity of the gang no longer appeals to them, some former gang members 
may then gravitate to more mature organizations.282 
As with age groups, there are differences in peer pressures among specific 
societies.283 Peer pressure in collectivist societies, particularly in the Middle East, is 
stronger than those in Western culture, which tend to be much more individualistic.284 
Individualistic societies assume people are independent; they think and behave according 
to their own beliefs rather than the group’s.285 Each person is unique and is encouraged 
to do things that are personally beneficial.286 Conversely, in collectivist societies, people 
are interdependent on one another and must constantly act and react to others around 
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them.287 Each person may be viewed as an individual but ultimately they are inseparable 
from the group. It is the group that sets the ideology and values around which members 
are centered.288 
B. CULTURAL TRANSMISSION THEORY 
One theory used to explain peer influence is cultural transmission.289 This theory 
posits that all behavior is learned from the society or culture that surrounds a person, and 
that  ideology, values and norms of behavior are “transmitted” from generation to 
generation.290 Though transmission is linear from top down, such as parent to child, 
behavior is not something that can be passed down biologically; it is something learned 
through experience and participation in society.291 Cultural transmission theory has been 
used to explain the transmission of delinquency from generation to generation. 
1. The Hardaway Brothers 
In terms of group membership, having a family member as part of a group greatly 
increases the probability of an individual being a member also.292 A study by the 
National Gang Crime Research Center determined that most gang members had family 
members already in a gang.293 Take the case of Derek Hardaway. On September 1, 1994, 
Derrick was just 14 years old when he drove his brother, Cragg, away from the scene of a 
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Chicago murder and was subsequently arrested.294 Cragg was 16 years when he shot 
Robert “Yummy” Sandifer, who himself was only 11 years old.  
Derrick and Cragg Hardaway were close brothers who were both active members 
of the notorious Black Disciple street gang.295 Cragg was first to join, at the age of 12, 
with Derrick following closely behind him two years later. At first, Cragg peddled crack 
cocaine for the gang, but later his allegiance to the gang would transform him and his 
brother into murderers.296 Derrick, at the age of 12, idolized his brother and wanted to be 
a gang member like him. He thought the gang would give him “nice cars, money, 
women…and name recognition,” like his brother.297  
Their victim, Yummy, was an 11-year-old member of the same gang who had a 
long juvenile arrest record.298 Yummy had shot and killed a 14-year-old girl named 
Shavon Dean mistakenly in August 1994. This caused a huge media uproar in the 
Chicago.299 The Black Disciples, disgusted with the negative attention, decided to have 
Yummy executed. They chose Cragg and Derrick to be the assassins. They lured Yummy 
to a dark underpass along a remote viaduct in downtown Chicago, where Cragg shot 
Yummy in the back of the head three times, killing him instantly. Derrick, who acted as 
the lookout and the getaway driver, recounts why he helped his brother: 
I knew what was going to happen but there was nothing I could do…This 
is my blood [Cragg]. It was either Robert [Yummy]…or him.300 
Derrick’s experience is all too common among kids joining gangs in an attempt to 
emulate an older sibling, parent or other family member.301  
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2. The Tsarnev Brothers 
Another pair of brothers, Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnev, were convicted of 
planting explosives at the Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013. The blast killed three 
people and injured over 250 others.302 Both brothers had been radicalized to commit acts 
of terror against the American people through the teachings of Anwar al-Awlaki and 
other senior Al-Qaida leaders. They wanted to punish America in retaliation for what 
they believed was poor treatment of Muslims, which would allow them to become 
“mujahedeen.”303  
Tamerlan was killed by authorities shortly after the attack and Dzhokhar was 
arrested and sentenced to death for using weapons of mass destruction304 During trial, 
lead defense attorney Judy Clarke acknowledged Dzhokhar’s guilt, but believed he 
should not face the death penalty because he was merely following his brother, 
Tamerlan.305 The defense claimed Tamerlan held considerable influence over Dzhokhar 
and that peer pressure was the true reason behind him assisting in the attack.306 
Dzhokhar’s tragedy, much like Derrick Hardaway’s, began with  familial peer pressure. 
But how?  
The Tsarnev family immigrated to the United States from Russia in 2002, as 
refugees. Eventually, Dzhokhar resided with his brother, Tamerlan, and their parents, 
Anzor and Zubeidat, in Cambridge, Massachusetts.307 Dzhokhar attended the University 
of Massachusetts at Dartmouth, where fellow students described him as popular and 
rather “normal” person.308 He liked to smoke marijuana, listen to hip-hop and seldom 
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talked about politics, least of all jihad.309 According to The Economist, he seemed “to 
have been much more concerned with sports and cheeseburgers than with religion, at 
least judging by his Twitter-feed.”310 So what could turn an ordinary young man into a 
terrorist? According to John Curran, Tamerlan’s boxing coach, Dzhokhar used to follow 
his brother around “like a puppy dog,” which exposed the younger brother to the older 
brother’s extremist ideology.311  
Unlike Dzhokhar, his brother Tamerlan was a devout Muslim who belonged to 
the Islamic Society of Boston Mosque near their home in Cambridge.312 According to 
Americans for Peace and Tolerance, an interfaith group that investigates Islamic 
mosques, the Islamic Society of Boston Mosque “teaches a brand of Islamic thought that 
encourages grievances against the West, distrust of law enforcement and opposition to 
Western forms of government, dress and social values.”313 Several people who attended 
the mosque have been investigated for terrorism, including Abdulrahman Alamoudi, the 
mosque’s first president, who was convicted in a terrorist plot to assassinate a Saudi 
prince.314  
In 2011, Russia’s Federal Security Service warned the FBI that Tamerlan was a 
violent Islamic extremist looking to immigrate to Russia and join a terrorist group.315 
Although the FBI investigated and surveilled Tamerlan for a short time, they found no 
evidence of terrorist activity.316 However, he was entered into the CIA’s Terrorist 
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Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) database, used for identifying suspected 
terrorists.317 
But if cultural transmission theory can be used to explain the peer pressure 
exuberated by family, what about schoolmates, neighbors or others that don’t reside in 
the household?  
C. DIFFERENTIAL ASSOCIATION THEORY 
The theory of differential association was developed in the 1970s by Edwin 
Sutherland to explain why people commit crimes.318 Sutherland suggests criminal 
behavior is learned through various forms of association, interaction and communication 
amongst intimate personal groups.319 These groups do not necessarily have to be part of 
one’s family or reside in the same household—they can be anyone with whom a person 
has an intimate relationship. Delinquency, however, is not merely acquired through 
contact with other delinquents; it is also acquired through exposure to attitudes that 
support delinquency.320 Together, supportive attitudes and delinquent peers reinforce 
beliefs, attitudes and values that perpetuate criminal behavior.321 
Differential association theory can be used to explain more than just petty 
delinquency. Since crime is understood to be a learned behavior, this theory can apply to 
other forms of criminal behavior, such as white-collar crime or even terrorism.322 In 
2008, a New Zealand research project by Doctors Keren Brooking, Ben Gardiner and 
Sarah Clavert investigated gang affiliations.323 Based upon interviews of active and 
former gang members, they concluded that having friends in gangs was the greatest factor 
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that influenced them to join.324 Sam, a “Young Eastsider” gang member describes why 
he joined his gang: 
When I was first attracted to these friends in gangs I was at Intermediate 
(School). Then the crowd I was hanging around with at secondary school 
got into smoking drugs, gangs-I didn’t really care about education at the 
time. I had a mind set about who gives a shit, sorry, care about this and 
that. My identity, I didn’t know who I was really, and I thought smoking 
drugs made me feel cool and it calmed me down…There was this gang of 
Young Eastsiders and we used to hang around with them and then they 
started getting us into smoking dope-we used to look up to them.325  
1. Tewhan “Massacre” Butler and Amorzi bin Nurhasyim 
Another example of differential association is seen in the case of Tewhan Butler, 
also known as “Massacre”—a 34-year-old member of the notorious Blood (Double 
ii/QSBG) gang. He is currently incarnated in federal prison for drug offenses and is 
serving an eleven-year sentence. When Massacre was asked why he joined a gang, he 
replied: 
The question sort of threw me, though it is a question that one may figure I 
get asked often…My environment sort of shaped my thoughts, and left me 
thinking that much right was wrong. And if I wasn’t doing wrong, then 
there was no way I could be right…My time, effort, and energy went 
toward the streets and what I thought I knew of them. I’ll admit I was 
young; but I wanted was what I wanted. Knowing better did not always 
mean doing better. What I wanted to do was whatever my homeboys were 
doing. To me that meant loyalty…Loyalty is why I joined the gang. 
Loyalty to my people.326  
Peer pressure and recruitment from friends is not indicative to street gangs but 
applies to terrorist organizations as well. McCauley writes:  
As with criminal gangs, individuals are recruited to a terrorist group via 
personal connections with existing members. No terrorist wants to try to 
recruit someone who might betray the terrorist to authorities. In practice, 
this means recruiting from the network of friends, lovers, and family. 
Trust may determine the network within which radicals and terrorists 
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recruit, but love often determines who will join…There is widespread 
agreement amongst researchers that ‘most terrorists…ultimately became 
members of the terrorist organization through personal connections with 
people or relatives associated with appropriate political initiatives, 
communes, self-supporting organizations, or committees—the number of 
couples and brothers and sisters was astonishingly high.327 
Amrozi bin Nurhasyim was a 40-year-old male convicted of the October 22, 2002 
bombing of two nightclubs in Bali.328 He was nicknamed the “Smiling Terrorist” because 
he smiled in front of media crews after his arrest.329 Amorzi was introduced to radical 
extremism through his brother, Mas Muklas.330 Amorzi stated: “It was Mas Muklas who 
raised my awareness to fight the injustice toward Islam.”331 
2. The Madrid Bombers 
Another example of differential association in terrorism is the Madrid Bombers. 
On March 11, 2004, a group of young Islamic terrorists conducted a series of coordinated 
attacks in the subway system in Madrid, Spain. The attacks killed 191 people and injured 
an additional 2,050.332 Hundreds of suspects were investigated, but in the end only 29 
people were charged; of those 29, only 6 were charged with murder.333  
The Madrid terrorists were primarily composed of first-generation North African 
Muslims, approximately 30 years old or younger.334 Some were illegal narcotic peddlers, 
part-time workers and university students. One such terrorist was a Moroccan immigrant 
named Jamal Ahmidan, who began selling drugs with two other terrorists, brothers 
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Mohammed and Rachid Ouland Akcha.335 Another member was Basel Ghayoun from 
Syria, roommate of fellow co-conspirator Anghar Foud el Morabit from Algeria.336 In 
terms of peer networks, two were brothers and another two where schoolmates. Basel 
Ghayoun and Anghar Foud el Morabit (schoolmates) met when they both joined a group 
led by Salafi Wahhabis Rabei Osman el Sayed Ahmed, more commonly known as 
“Mohamed the Egyptian.”337 The two were not brought together to commit an attack, 
but, through their shared religion, radicalized together.338 It was their learned behavior 
from el Sayed Ahmed that led them to participate in the bombing. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Peer networks and pressure are the strongest predictors of group membership 
street gangs and terrorist organizations. The influence of peer behavior is stronger in 
collectivist societies such as the Middle East, where there is greater interdependency 
amongst people. Cultural transmission through peer networks (especially family), occurs 
similarly in both street gangs and terrorist organizations. To account for those without 
family ties or from different cultures, differential association theory posits delinquency is 
learned from other delinquents, such as schoolmates, neighbors or friends.  
As prevention and intervention programs for radicalizing terrorists begin to take 
shape, the effects of peer networks and pressure should be investigated. 
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VI. MAIN IMPLICATIONS 
Most people do not join street gangs or terrorist organizations.339 Broad-based 
national or international gang and terrorist prevention programs are unlikely to capture 
those most in need.340 Intervention and prevention programs, therefore, must be based on 
local assessments and positioned in areas where there is a high rate of group membership. 
Programs based on local needs can be more intimately tailored to the members in the 
community who are most susceptible to join a street gang or terrorist organization.341 But 
how can a community develop a counter-terrorism program identifying high-risk 
individuals? What makes these high-risk individuals different from other similarly 
situated people in the community? For answers, we turn to the study of gangs. 
Much gang research conducted by criminologists is based on community 
assessments. Though some argue against comparing street gangs and terrorist 
organizations, this thesis shows many connections between what motivates individuals to 
join both groups. When people feel they are marginalized, discriminated against and 
powerless to bring about change, they turn to the only tool they have available: violence. 
This tool can be found in both street gangs and terrorist organizations. Because much 
gang research has already developed prevention and intervention programs, current gang 
knowledge can provide guidelines for developing counter-terrorism policies.  
The goal of this research was to determine if terrorists and street gang members 
possess the same motivators. To do so, the research focused on descriptions of events told 
by the individuals themselves: the street gang members and the terrorists. To compare 
their motivations, four individual characteristics were selected: identity, poverty, 
progression and peer influence. These four characteristics have been studied and 
understood as motivators for group membership.  
                                                 





Identity is a compilation of characteristics that sets individuals apart from others, 
and changes over time and exposure.342 According to psychoanalyst Erik Erikson, 
identity develops along a series of eight life stages, with each stage presenting a conflict 
the person must resolve before  continuing identity development.343 Of particular 
importance uncovered in the research was Erikson’s fifth stage of development, identity 
achievement versus role confusion. In this stage, the individual is attempting to figure out 
what kind of person he or she is, and the role he or she plays in society. If a person cannot 
find an identity or is unhappy with society’s prescribed identity, he or she is said to have 
an identity crisis. A person stuck in an identity crisis will try and resolve the conflict. 
This can be accomplished in several ways. The person can identify with a particular 
group and accept its identity—he or she can “foreclose” on this constructed identity and 
choose not to explore different roles. The person can also adopt an identity that is easily 
attainable, or one that is seen as the only option. This “only option,” of course, sometimes 
lands on the identity of a street gang member or a terrorist.  
Social identity theory postulates that a person’s identity is conceived in part 
through his or her membership in a particular group. Once the individual places himself 
into that group through a process of self-categorization, he begins to see himself as 
similar to the other group members, and so starts behaving like them.344 A person’s self-
esteem also becomes tied to the group’s status and they begin to compare their group to 
other groups.345 If they do not feel better off, they may become dissatisfied with their in-
group and seek to leave.  
Groups, therefore, must provide their members with a positive distinctiveness to 
retain and recruit members, as was the case with members of the Amal Movement who 
saw members of Hezbollah with a better military and regional standing—in an effort to 
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increase their self-esteem and status, they left the Amal Movement group and re-joined 
with Hezbollah.346 
SIT and the group dynamic it describes provides a tool for CVE policy makers 
and practitioners for developing intervention and prevention strategies. Though 
individuals join groups based on shared similarities, they will also leave a group if the 
group deflates their self-esteem. Herein lies a strategy for preventing high-risk 
individuals from joining a group, or from leaving. Policy that creates socially accepted 
groups that provide a positive distinctiveness may prove successful. Policy designed at 
diminishing a group’s reputation may convince members to leave a group as well. 
B. POVERTY 
Relative deprivation theory explains that a frustrated person—impoverished in 
some fashion—may engage in behavior in an effort to better his or her situation.347 Strain 
theory further explains how this frustration can develop for people in relation to 
society.348 For Merton, each culture, each society sets goals for its members. People are 
under “strain” to accomplish these goals and can become frustrated when they cannot; 
people will then engage in specific behavior in order to alleviate that strain.349 The 
culture and/or society may have socially accepted ways to alleviate that strain, and people 
can conform, innovate or rebel from those ways.350 If a person believes his path to obtain 
a goal is blocked or unattainable, he will seek out mechanisms to overcome the obstacles; 
if a gang or terrorist group presents itself as just such a mechanism, the individual may 
join.351 Sanchez-Jankowski believed a defiant individual will become involved in any 
behavior to make money, legal or illegal, and will resist any attempt to stop him.352 This 
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makes street gangs enticing because they are known as unconventional businesses that 
provide members with illicit employment.353 
Street gangs exist in impoverished parts of cities that suffer from social 
disorganization; they have weak governance, poor schooling, high unemployment and 
corruption.354 Social disorganization theory argues that higher rates of delinquency 
correlate to higher levels of social disorganization, as was seen with terrorist Johnny 
“Mad Dog” Adair—when the area around him began to deteriorate, he began offending. 
Some socially disorganized places in the Middle East, like Iraq, have seen the emergence 
of terror groups such as ISIS.355 Because these impoverished areas lack resources, 
residents must compete for them, and they often do so by banding together.356 When 
social institutions are unable to provide adequate resources for residents, street gangs and 
terrorist organizations can obtain those resources, providing an advantage for their 
members.  
The development of counter-terrorism programs should assess the needs of local 
residents in order to design realistic, attainable ways in which residents can have their 
needs met. CVE intervention programs need to include stakeholders in the community, 
such as school principals, local business owners and clergy, who can work together to 
serve as an alternative mechanism to street gangs or terrorist organizations. 
C. PROGRESSION 
The progression from ordinary citizen to terrorist or gang member can happen 
rapidly or occur over years, incrementally leading to a terrorist act. CVE policies should 
seek to identify someone who is on a trajectory to join a street gang or terrorist group 
before it is too late. The frustration that Middle Eastern youths feel during “waithood” 
has led some to join terrorist groups like al Shabab, which capitalize on those feelings of 
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frustration and offer an alternative path to progression.357 These feelings of stagnation 
are not only occurring in the Middle East; frustrated young adults in the United States 
have also felt the pain of graduating from school only to be unemployed. Some join 
gangs because of this stagnation.358 
According to Moghaddam, only a small number of people will actually climb the 
“staircase,” and go on to commit a terrorist act.359 O’Dean describes a similarly staged 
scenario for potential street gang members.360 For an intervention program to be useful, it 
should occur before key transitional stages on individuals’ trajectory into a street gang or 
terrorist group. 
D. PEER INFLUENCE 
One of the most consistent predictors of group membership is the influence of 
peers.361 Peer pressure can be positive or negative, and can exist in varying degrees 
among different societies. Peer pressure is stronger in collectivist, interdependent 
societies like those in the Middle East.362 In individualistic societies like the United 
States, however, people are more autonomous and act more freely, and are therefore less 
likely to fall victim to pressure from groups.363  
Cultural transmission explains how ideologies, values and norms are transmitted 
from generation to the next.364 Having a family member in a group greatly increases the 
likelihood of person belonging to the same group.365 Gang member Derrick Hardaway 
followed his older brother Cragg into the gang; the Boston Marathon bomber terrorists, 
Tamerlan and Dzhokar Tsarnev, were brothers; and Dzhokar followed his older brother 
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Tamerlan into radicalization.366 Differential association also explains that criminal 
behavior is learned through various forms of association, interaction, and communication 
among intimate personal groups, whether family members, friends, or other community 
members.367 Since delinquency and crime are understood to be learned behaviors, like 
any other behavior, this theory can be applicable to other forms of criminal behavior such 
as terrorism.368 
Once a radicalized person or terrorist is identified, CVE program developers 
should look to the individuals peer network for future program clients.  
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VII. POLICIES AND STRATEGIES 
This research intended to illustrate the similarities between some foreign terrorists 
and domestic U.S. street gang members in order to guide policy makers and practitioners 
who are developing counter-terrorism and counter-violent extremism policy, strategy, 
and programs. Its overarching goal is to stem the growth of terrorist organizations 
through effective new policies. Rather than wasting resources researching, inventing and 
developing new theories, these policy makers can turn to the robust study of gangs for 
practical direction, and can then adopt a best-practice approach. This research would be 
incomplete if it did not touch on past gang prevention policies and programs.  
The 2015 White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism advocates for a 
community-oriented approach to policy making.369 The Comprehensive Community-
Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, more commonly referred to as the Spergel Model, is 
a program in use today to deal with gangs. It is a comprehensive, community-oriented 
approach that may serve as a model for future CVE programs.370 
A. GANG PROGRAM SYNOPSIS 
In 1987, the United States Department of Justice launched the Juvenile Gang 
Suppression and Intervention Research and Development Program, headed by Dr. Irving 
Spergel of the University of Chicago.371 Research teams surveyed 254 various public and 
private agencies in 45 different cities across the country on their gang programs.372 The 
program’s goal was to identify the best practices of each program and determine an 
effective method in which to measure their success. Based upon the data collected, 
Spergel found common strategies in a preponderance of the programs that fit into four 
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broad categories: community organization, social intervention, opportunity provision and 
suppression.373 
Community organization involves local community leaders, community groups, 
business owners, local citizens and former gang members.374 When all these stakeholders 
cooperate, they can take advantage of the diverse skills, resources and knowledge to 
collectively solve a community’s gang problem. This includes mobilizing the community, 
building community trust and education.375  
Social interventions are the most common methods used to combat street 
gangs.376 They involve a collection of coordinated efforts among youth-based agencies, 
religious organizations and police who work in a community.377 These strategies include: 
crisis intervention, mentoring programs, dispute resolution between gangs, counseling 
and drug treatment programs.378   
Opportunity provisions attempt to provide jobs, job training, education and job 
placement to at-risk youth. These types of strategies also include assisting in formal 
education.379  
Suppression efforts are strictly a collection of law enforcement efforts. This 
includes police, prosecutors, prisons, parole, probation and specialized gang units.380 
They also include monitoring gang members and at-risk youth.381 
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B. MEASUREMENTS OF PROGRAM SUCCESS 
One of Spergel’s more difficult tasks was assessing a program’s success. There 
are several commonly used measurements:  
• Number of program clients 
• Number of services a program can provide 
• Increase in school attendance and performance by program clients 
• Reduction in gang violence and criminal behavior 
• Increase in parent-community involvement 
• Increase in parent involvement in school 
• Increase in community volunteerism 
• Increase in and strength of community mobilization efforts382 
These measurements, however, are wrought with problems. For example, the 
number of clients a program is able to service is not an adequate measure of success, 
since only a small portion of the youth population is at risk for joining a street gang, and 
even a smaller number actually join.383 Programs designed to accommodate a high 
number of clients will undoubtedly include likely non-joiners, which makes them 
unnecessarily costly and inefficient.384 Klein and Maxson write:  
Number of clients served becomes the goal rather than numbers possibly 
affected, or client satisfaction replaces client change, or general youth 
services replace focused gang prevention activity.385  
Klein and Maxson also describe the problem of “goal displacement.”386 This is 
when program goals that are not easily achieved are replaced by goals more readily 
amenable to a measurement of success.387 Gang intervention programs have a history of 
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dissolving into non-gang programs e.g., after school tutoring programs.388 Such programs 
become fashioned upon an ability to measure something rather than effectiveness. 
Effectiveness is perhaps the most difficult measure because success can have many 
definitions. These measurements are so difficult to assess, in fact, that many programs 
shifted away from dissuading youths to join gangs, instead focusing energy on trying to 
measure how well the program was implemented.389 In other words, success is measured 
by how efficiently and economically the program was implemented rather than how 
effective it truly was.  
At the crux of all these measurements is the ability to determine suitable program 
clients. Prevention programs need to identify those individuals most at risk for joining 
street gangs, which requires some form of early identification. Once program clients are 
identified, program resources can be swiftly and efficiently deployed. 
Intervention programs are even more complex because the individuals are already 
in a gang, for which they have developed social bonds and allegiances. Intervention 
programs have had difficulty persuading gang members to leave a gang because most 
programs have not demonstrated more appealing advantages than staying in the gang.390 
Intervention programs must illustrate a suitable alternative to being in a gang. 
Suppression is the most common approach; though it is most easily measurable, it 
is the least effective approach. As Klein and Maxson reason, “Los Angeles County is said 
to have 85,000 gang members, a staggering figure. If we were to crack down on and put 
away these 85,000 gang individuals, within 10 years we’d have another 85,000 to put 
away.”391 Governments and communities cannot arrest their way out of the street gang 
problem. Spergel’s research showed suppression programs ranked at the bottom of 
effective programs in reducing gang membership.392 Yet despite this acknowledgement, 
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the law enforcement approach in dealing with gangs is the most popular.393 The criminal 
justice system spends around $150 billion dollars a year; this is up from $11 billion in the 
1970s, and this number will continue to grow due to the increase in securitization after 
9/11.394  
With the advent of statistical data the criminal justice system has to come to rely 
so heavily on, measurement can be reduced to a series of numbers. Thus, the manner in 
which those numbers increase or decrease becomes a demonstrable measurement of 
success. Spergel found suppression efforts through the criminal justice system only 
worked as short-term solutions. Although he believed short-term solutions were still 
needed, he argued that they must be coupled with longer-term policies. The recent 
dramatic increase in gang-related violence in Baltimore demonstrates this fact. When 
asked about the role law enforcement should play in stemming that violence, Baltimore 
Community Activist Munir Bahar stated: 
People are focusing on enforcement, not preventing violence. Police 
enforce a code, a law. Our job as the community is to prevent the violence, 
and we’ve failed….We need anti-violence organizations, we need 
mentorship programs, we need a long-term solution. But we also need 
immediate relief. When we’re in something so deep, we have to stop it 
before you can analyze what the root is.395 
Bahar recognizes the community’s need to provide long-term solutions to deal 
with gangs, but he also understands the need for law enforcement, if only as a short-term 
solution to stem the violence. Criminal justice efforts should be viewed as a stop gap to 
prevent immediate violence and criminal behavior, not as a long-term solution to reduce 
problems associated with gangs and terrorist groups. 
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C. THE SPERGEL MODEL: A COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITY-WIDE 
APPROACH TO GANG PREVENTION 
• Spergel was not just commissioned to study country-wide gang programs 
for best practices; he was also funded to develop a program of his own. He 
did so by synthesizing the best practices he and his team discovered during 
research. The result was the Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach 
to Gang Prevention. With this approach, Spergel offered a general 
community-oriented program design. It was the first attempt to a 
comprehensive approach that involved multiple stakeholders in the 
community.396 According to this model, future and current gang programs 
should contain the following elements: Programs should work to educate 
community stakeholders of their community’s gang problem. 
• Programs should effectively and collectively organize community 
stakeholders to combat gangs. 
• Programs must set goals and objectives. They should be clearly delineated 
so stakeholders have a clear path to work toward completing them. These 
should also include short-term suppression efforts from law enforcement 
and longer-term strategies such as job training and placement.  
• Programs should have relevant programming and justify approaches and 
services.  
• Programs should address and seek to increase youth accountability.  
• Programs must be adequately staffed with properly trained personnel. 
• Practices must be thoroughly and constantly assessed to determine its 
effectiveness. 
• Programs must be properly funded based on effectiveness.397 
In 1993, Spergel rolled out the first version of his program in the Little Village 
section of Chicago.398 Without review or assessment to determine if the program was 
working, it spread to five other cities. It was not until mid-2002 that program evaluations 
began to trickle in. Based upon initial assessments, it was not a success. The main 
problem appeared to be the way the program was implemented in the cities. Other noted 
problems were: 
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• The program was not adequately articulated in writing with clear goals 
• The program did not adequately provide a method of implementation 
• Some of the jurisdictions were not capable of handling the complexities of 
the program 
• The program lacked a competent coordinator 
• The program was not constantly monitored, evaluated and corrected399 
D. THE WAY FORWARD 
The Spergel Model was an attempt to combine prevention, intervention and 
suppression into one community-oriented program.400 It therefore makes an excellent 
model for those drafting new CVE policies. Those drafters, however, must be mindful of 
the Spergel program’s failures. In addition to avoiding the identified pitfalls, they should 
adopt similar strategies the program successfully promoted to fight street gangs.401 Those 
strategies should revolve around community participation, intervention, job training and 
placement, defined program focus for all stakeholders and short-term suppression 
options.  
Long-term CVE strategies should include policies that can mobilize and involve 
members of the community, including public and private entities. Those strategies have 
to develop long-term relationships with these stakeholders that foster mutual cooperation 
in resolving the community’s radical extremism problems. Each stakeholder must 
understand and be actively involved in its solution. 
Intervention programs should begin by identifying those who are radicalizing. 
This research provides a starting point—once a person has been identified as a potential 
program client, intervention and outreach programs can be specifically aimed at de-
radicalization. Individuals who have benefited from the program should also be used to 
further help others in need. These people can relate better to potential program clients and 
can illustrate a positive alternative to violent extremism. 
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Developing opportunities for those progressing along the path of extremism may 
be difficult in the midst of sluggish economies. However, modern job training programs 
coupled with available placement may provide a healthy alternative to a terrorist group 
for those in stagnation. Job creation from private partners in the program is essential for 
providing these alternatives. 
The community, furthermore, cannot expect to arrest its way out of violent 
extremism. Law enforcement, vigorous prosecutions and increasing correctional 
programs should only be used as short-term remedies to stop immediate threats from 
those already radicalized. Once radicalized individuals enter the criminal justice system, 
intervention and education programs must be available to rehabilitate them to non-
criminal behavior. 
Careful attention must be given to how the program is implemented. The program 
should: 
• Be adequately defined with clear goals of countering violent extremism. It 
must also include how this is done.   
• Identify those most in need of the services provided by the program. 
• Be headed by a well-trained program leader who is able to successfully 
navigate the programs complexities and coordinate the stakeholders 
effectively. 
• Have ongoing evaluation, assessment and accountability. It must measure 
its success and failure. It must also be agile and able to change once 
problems are encountered.   
• Start off in test communities before being implemented to broader 
communities. Once successful foundational aspects of the program are 
realized they can then be mimicked in other areas. 
Most importantly: None of the new CVE policies, strategies or programs will 
matter unless satisfactory program clients are identified. This research provided a better 
understanding of who these people are, and how they can be identified when they are at 
risk. 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Post-9/11, much attention has been placed on securitization and law enforcement 
efforts as methods to suppress terrorist groups. Yet, despite this effort, people continue to 
join terrorist organizations at alarming rates. A longer-term strategy is needed if we are to 
prevent future attacks. One possible strategy is to prevent individuals from joining 
terrorist groups in the first place. If the federal government is looking for a 
comprehensive, community-oriented approach to deter citizens from joining violent 
groups, they can benefit from the study of domestic street gang recruitment.    
To utilize this research effectively, the federal government must agree that street 
gangs and terrorist groups share similarities. This research explored the commonalities 
based on four key characteristics that influence people to join groups: identity 
deprivation, poverty, progression and peer pressure.  
Identity is not something a person is born with, but rather something that is 
acquired and evolves throughout a person’s life. It is the answer to the question, “What 
kind of person am I?” Erikson believed such a question must be answered before a person 
can be intimate with others and become a successful adult. Identity can develop and be 
obtained in a variety of ways, though one common way is through a process of self-
categorization. A person places himself in a particular group that has people with whom 
he shares similar characteristics. Once a member, he adopts the identity, status and 
behavior of that group. Group members then start to compare themselves to members of 
other groups. If they are faring better, than they will stay; if they are faring worse, they 
may leave their group and join another.  
CVE policy makers should capitalize on the significance of this group process. If 
policy makers wish to prevent people from joining a terrorist group or cause members to 
leave, they have to convince members that they would fare better if they were not a 
member of that group. The programs should help these individuals understand that 
terrorist groups have negative value and cause a diminished social status, which will 
make them unattractive to join or to stay in long term.   
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As this research also demonstrated, it is no coincidence that many gang members 
and terrorists had family members, schoolmates and/or close intimate friends in their 
respective groups prior to them joining. Once a street gang member or terrorist is 
identified, program workers should search their peer networks (including siblings, 
schoolmates and close intimate friends) for potential candidates for intervention and 
prevention programs. These networks exert a significant amount of influence concerning 
whether a person joins or avoids a group. Getting to a program client early, before the 
person can form cohesive social bonds to a terrorist group, is essential.  
Culture and the structure of society are harder to change. Gangs thrive in 
communities with failing social and economic institutions principally because the 
communities are too weak to combat them. Gangs can also be found in impoverished 
communities where resources are scarce. Gangs become particularly attractive because 
they can provide their members access to resources they would otherwise be unable to 
obtain. CVE programs will have a hard time developing a remedy to failed social 
institutions. In sluggish economies, it is not always possible to find potential program 
clients employment. There also may not be adequate funding for job training and 
placement.  
Ali believed entrepreneurship could be a successful remedy for CVE programs to 
combat failing social institutions. Teaching people to take charge of their economic 
destiny is a way to counter a dwindling job market. People, especially those stuck in 
“waithood,” should not simply wait for a job to come to them or pin their hopes on 
government assistance. Instead, they should go out into their communities and create 
their own opportunities. This can be accomplished by changing the way in which we train 
future generations. Entrepreneurship and support of emerging small business can be a 
way to accomplish this goal.  
Changing how we view each other and the environments in which terrorist groups 
operate may seem like a lofty goal. But if we are to prevent future terrorist attacks, we 
must make longer-term efforts to stem their recruitment. The material covered in this 
research and the examples provided illustrate that there are similarities between street 
gang members and terrorists. If nothing else, it reminds us that gangs and terrorist 
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organizations are still groups of people. Prevention and intervention programs will fare 
better if they are fashioned from what is known about group processes and mentalities.  
There is a long academic history in the study of gangs. That accumulated 
knowledge coupled with the experiences of successful and failed intervention programs 
should provide a solid starting point for countering violent extremist strategies. There is 
no need to develop brand new models or spend years developing a program from the 
ground up. The way forward is already there in the gang literature.  
The study of street gangs may not provide all the answers, but, at the very least, it 
may show us what has not worked in the past, and guide future programs. In our 
endearing effort to stem the growth of gangs and terrorist organizations, this research 
concludes with a passage from Klein, Maxson and Miller: 
There are few guidelines for success, only continuing approaches that 
“feel right,” those that conform to conventional wisdoms…The saddest 
message of all is simply this; little that has been done can be demonstrated 
to be useful. Thus, the clues for the future have less to do with what might 
work, than with avoiding in the future what has not worked.402 
                                                 
402 Klein and Maxson, Street Gang: Patterns and Policies, 246. 
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